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LIST OF PARTIES
The parties to the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals
from which this Petition of Certiorari is taken are Jack C.
Daniels and Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association.
Jack C. Daniels died on or about February 26, 1989.
Suggestion of Death on the record was made in the Court of
Appeals, but no substitution of parties has been ordered.

This

Petition is authorized by Alice Daniels, widow of the said Jack C.
Daniels, and substitution of parties will be made as may be
directed by this court.
It is the belief of counsel for petitioner that this
action sounding in contract has not abated.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
REFERENCE TO REPORT OF OPINIONS ISSUED BY
COURT OF APPEALS
CONCISE STATEMENT OF GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION
OF SUPREME COURT IS INVOKED
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ISSUANCE OF WRIT
POINT I.A. JACK C. DANIELS, GENERAL CONTRACTOR ON
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT, WAS INDUCED BY PROJECT
OWNERS NOT TO FILE LIEN WITHIN NORMAL 100-DAY
FILING PERIOD, AND OWNERS ARE THEREBY ESTOPPED
FROM PLEADING UNTIMELY FILING OF NOTICE LIEN IN
DEFENSE TO LIEN FORECLOSURE. THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO SO RULE, AND SPECIAL AND
IMPORTANT REASONS EXIST FOR THIS COURT TO REVIEW
THAT ERROR.
POINT I.B. IS A SUBSEQUENT LENDER WHO DERIVED HIS
TRUST DEED INTEREST FROM THE AFORESAID OWNER
AFTER THE RECORDING OF THE SAID MECHANIC'S LIEN,
LIKEWISE SUBJECT TO THE SAME ESTOPPEL?
POINT II.A. ON APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER
COURT ON MOTION TO DISMISS (WHICH WAS
DENOMINATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THE LOWER COURT),
THE COURT OF APPEALS CANNOT DETERMINE AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT SUMS PAYABLE TO GENERAL CONTRACTOR
PURSUANT TO "COST-PLUS" BUILDING CONTRACT WERE
"INVESTOR PROFITS" AND NOT LIENABLE, RATHER THAN
FOR SERVICES AND MATERIALS FURNISHED ON THE JOB,
WHICH ARE LIENABLE
POINT II.B. JUDGE DAVIDSON ERRONEOUSLY ELIMINATES
OWNERS, AS A CLASS, FROM MECHANIC'S LIEN RIGHTS . .
POINT III. DOES THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
WRITTEN BY JUDGE DAVIDSON IN WHICH THE OTHER TWO
JUDGES ON THE PANEL ONLY CONCUR IN THE RESULT,
BUT WRITE NO OPINIONS, SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT
OF RULE 30(c), RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
REQUIRING THE "REASONS" FOR THE DECISION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS TO BE SET FORTH IN WRITING? . . .
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX

1
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
7

8

11

13
15

16
20
22

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Page
Constitution of Utah
Article VIII, Section 4

19

Rules of Utah Supreme Court
Title VI
Rule 43(2)
Rule 43(3)
Rule 43(4)

3
13
13, 17
8, 12, 19

Rules of Utah Court of Appeals
Rule 2
Rule 30(c)
Utah Code Annotated
Section 38-1-3
Section 38-1-7
Section 57-3-2
Section 78-2-2(5)
Section 78-2a-4

19
2, 3, 17, 18
3
3
3, 12
3
3

53 Am Jur 2d, Mechanic's Liens
Section 107

14

Beltline Brick Co. v. Standard Home Building Co.
213 NW 41 (Minn. 1927)

10

Carr v. Hoffman
256 NY 254, 176 NE 383
(Ct. of Appeals of NY 1931)

10

Crompton v. Jenson
78 Ut 55, 1 P2d 242 (1931)

12

Cushman v. Day
602 P2d 327 (Oregon 1979)

10

Mathis v. Thunderbird Village, Inc.
236 Oregon 425, 389 P2d 343 (1964)

14

Rice v. Granite School District
23 Ut 2d 22, 456 P2d 159
Smith v. Oregon Shortline Railraod Co.
30 Ut 246, 84 P 108 (1906)

9
12

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JACK C. DANIELS,
Third-Party Plaintiff
and Appellant,
vs.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.f
Third-Party Defendants and
Deseret Federal Savings &
Loan Association being
also Respondent.

!
]1

Docket No.

]•

PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CEN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]

JACK C. DANIELS, et al.,
Defendants.

]
]

Third-party plaintiff and appellant, Jack C. Daniels,
hereby petitions the Supreme Court of Utah for Writ of Certiorari
to review Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this action.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
l.A.

Where general contractor on condominium project is

induced by project owners not to file lien within the 100-day
filing period, are owners estopped from pleading untimely filing
as a defense to contractor's lien rights;

and B.

Is a subsequent

lender who derived his trust deed interest through the aforesaid
project owners after recording of said mechanic's lien and with
actual notice thereof likewise estopped?

2.A.

On appeal from Judgment of the lower court on

Motion to Dismiss, can the Court of Appeals determine as a matter
of law that sums payable to general contractor under "cost-plus"
building contract were nonlienable "investor profits," rather than
for services and materials furnished on the job which are
lienable?

and B.

Does an ownership interest preclude a

contractor from asserting a lien for labor performed or materials
furnished on the job?
3.

Does the Decision of the Court of Appeals written

by Judge Davidson in which the other two judges on the panel
concur in the result, but write no opinions, satisfy the
requirement of Rule 30(c), Rules of the Court of Appeals,
requiring the "reasons" for the decision of the Court of Appeals
to be set forth in writing?
REFERENCE TO REPORT OF OPINIONS ISSUED BY COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Court of Appeals was designated for
publication and is found at 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (See Appendix)
CONCISE STATEMENT OF GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION
OF SUPREME COURT IS INVOKED
A.

Date of entry of decision sought to be reviewed:

The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered April 5, 1989.
B.

Date of entry of any order respecting rehearing:

Order denying Appellant's Petition for Rehearing was entered April
26, 1989. There has been no order granting extension of time.
C.

Crosspetition:

None.

D.

Jurisdiction to review conferring jurisdiction on

the Supreme Court: The statutory provision believed to confer on
the Supreme Court of Utah jurisdiction to review decision of the
Court of Appeals by Writ of Certiorari is 78-2-2(5)f 78-2a-4, Utah
Code Annotated, and Title VI f Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
E.

Controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes,

ordinances and regulations:
Rule 30(c), Rules of Utah Court of Appeals (See Appendix);
Section 38-1-3, UCA (1981/82 version) set forth in Appendix;
Section 38-1-7, UCA (1981/82 version) set forth in Appendix;
Section 57-3-2, UCA (1981/82 version) set forth in Appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE.

This action was commenced in the

lower court by plaintiff, CEN Corporation, against Daniels and
certain other defendants, seeking to cancel of record a mechanic's
lien filed by Daniels.

In the lower court Daniels sought, by

Counterclaim and Third-party Complaint (see Appendix), to
foreclose his mechanic's lien against third-party defendant and
respondent, Deseret Federal Savings & Loan, and others.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

Respondent, Deseret Federal

Savings & Loan Association (hereinafter referred to as "Deseret
Federal"), when served with Third-party Complaint seeking
foreclosure of mechanic's lien, filed a Motion to Dismiss for
alleged failure of Daniels to state a claim.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT.

The lower court granted

Motion to Dismiss of Deseret Federal by Memorandum Decision (see
Appendix) and thereupon entered "Summary Judgment" (see Appendix)
in favor of the said respondent.
By its decision entered April 5, 1989, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1980 a joint venture known as Park Avenue Development
Company was formed, consisting of Kenneth Sitzburger, Michael
McCoy, Resort Consultants, Ltd., a Utah general partnership, and
JML, a Utah limited partnership.

The general partner of JML was a

corporation known as Milajack Corporation.

The limited partners

of JML were appellant, Jack C. Daniels, Michael Dangerfield, Larry
Lunnell and Kent Fuller.

Daniels invested $28,000 in JML,

Dangerfield $18,000, Fuller $28,000, and Lunnell $6,000.

The

entire $80,000 was invested by JML in Park Avenue Development
Company on behalf of JML for a 20% interest in said joint venture.
(See pages 10-13, 21-23, and 69-70 of Daniels' deposition in
Appendix hereto.)

In addition to the foregoing, the joint

venture, Park Avenue Development Company, entered into a separate
Building Contract Agreement with appellant, Jack C. Daniels, dba
JD Construction (see Appendix).
The Building Contract Agreement was a cost-plus contract
and provided that Daniels, as contractor, be paid:

"Article VIII. It is hereby mutually agreed between
the parties hereto that the sum to be paid by PARK AVENUE
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY to the CONTRACTOR for said work and
materials shall be $757,000.00 SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN
AND NO/100 Dollars plus profit and overhead of $80,253.00
EIGHTY THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-THREE AND NO/100.
"This payment shall be made within 60 days after
this contract is fulfilled."
The $80,253 was intended to be approximately 10% of outof-pocket costs.

(See pages 10-13, 21-23, and 69-70 of Daniels

deposition in Appendix.)
Daniels completed his work as contractor on the eightplex in the summer of 1981, however, the property owner was trying
to obtain refinancing and, prior to expiration of the 100-day
period, requested that Daniels not lien the property and
represented that if Daniels would refrain from so doing, Daniels
would be paid the balance of his contractor's fee of $80,253 (not
JML's 20% interest in the project) within two weeks.

In reliance

thereon Daniels did not lien the property within the usual 100
days provided by Utah lien law, 38-1-7, UCA.
Thereafter, on or about December 1, 1981, the pipes in
the eight-plex froze.

The owner called Daniels claiming that

Daniels had not properly completed the job, thus resulting in the
frozen pipes, and asked that he return to the jobsite.

Daniels

returned on December 1, 1981, to seek the cause and extent of
damage and to commence any necessary work.

There he ascertained

the problem, made estimates of cost, called subcontractors and
made inquiries regarding insurance coverage.

The developers,

apparently fearing that they had made a mistake in asking Daniels
to return to the property and thereby extend his lien rights,
dismissed him and did not permit him to do any further work on the
premises.
Daniels filed his lien February 3, 1982. Thereafter, on
February 22, 1982, Deseret Federal, refinanced the property for
the then-owner, and Note and Trust Deeds were executed that date
and recorded March 1, 1982, almost one month after the recording
of Daniels' Notice of Lien.

Although discovery was never

completed in this case, as a Motion to Dismiss was granted, it is
clear that before loaning on the property Deseret Federal received
a title report and thus had actual knowledge of the Daniels lien.
The original owner assigned its rights in the project to
CEN Corporation, and CEN Corporation filed suit against Daniels
and other defendants on or about February 25, 1982, seeking to
cancel Daniels' mechanic's lien. Daniels filed Answer and Counterclaim and also, with leave of the court, Amendment to Counterclaim
and Third-Party Complaint seeking foreclosure of his lien.
Deseret Federal filed a Motion to Dismiss for alleged
failure to state a claim, and the court granted said motion and
entered "Summary Judgment" (R. 243 & in Appendix) in favor of
Deseret Federal.

The lower court's reasoning was that the work

done in December was not sufficient to extend Daniels' lien
rights, and that Deseret Federal was "not in privity with Daniels"
and unless Deseret Federal itself committed the conduct consti-

tuting an estoppel, estoppel by its predecessor in title was not
available against it. (R. 238 & in Appendix)
Daniels appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the

lower court by an opinion filed April 5, 1989, written by Judge
Davidson (see Appendix).

Judge Regnal W. Garff and Judge Norman

H. Jackson "concurred" in the result, but did not file a separate
opinion or opinions.
The minority opinion by Judge Davidson found that the
work done in December was not sufficient to extend Daniels1 lien
rights, and further determined as a matter of law that the
"$80,000" owing to Daniels was money owed to him as an "investor"
and not as a contractor, and was therefore not lienable, and Judge
Davidson said that for that reason he did "not need to reach the
merits of the estoppel argument."

In Note 1 on page 5, however,

Judge Davidson stated:
"It is undisputed that approximately $15,000 was paid to .
Daniels for his services as contractor. What the 'overhead1
represented is unclear. In any case, failure to properly
preserve the lien right precludes any claim that this
overhead should be the subject of a lien." (Emphsis added.)
In the footnote Judge Davidson thus determines that
estoppel is not available to Daniels.
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ISSUANCE OF WRIT
Special and important reasons, within the meaning of
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, exist for review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

Although petitioner believes

that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the work done
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by Daniels in December 1981 did not extend his lien rights, that
error is not asserted as the basis justifying the granting of this
petition.

The more important issue is whether Daniels is in any

event entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of estoppel to
extend his lien rights.

The handling of the estoppel issue by the

Court of Appeals is not only error, but error involving the Utah
building and finance industries and the application of the
recording act to mechanic's liens.
POINT I.A.

JACK C. DANIELS, GENERAL CONTRACTOR ON

CONDOMINIUM PROJECT, WAS INDUCED BY PROJECT OWNERS NOT TO FILE
LIEN WITHIN NORMAL 100-DAY FILING PERIOD, AND OWNERS ARE THEREBY
ESTOPPED FROM PLEADING UNTIMELY FILING OF NOTICE LIEN IN DEFENSE
TO LIEN FORECLOSURE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO SO

RULE, AND SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS EXIST FOR THIS COURT TO
REVIEW THAT ERROR.
The decision as to whether or not an owner can be
estopped by conduct from asserting the defense of failure to file
a mechanic's lien within the 100 days provided by statute is a
special and important question of state law which has not been,
but should be, settled by this court, and meets the requirements
of Rule 43(4) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
This court has held that an insurance company is
estopped to assert the statute of limitations in a personal injury
matter by reason of representations made by insurance adjusters to
injured persons, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of such

statute of limitations and even in the absence of actual fraud.
See Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Ut 2d 22f 456 P2d 159. We
respectfully submit that the same arguments in favor of estoppel
in that situation support it here.
In Rice the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of
an employee of the defendant school district, was repeatedly
assured by the insurance adjuster that she would be compensated
for her damages as soon as they were ascertainedr and was thereby
misled into waiting beyond the statutory filing period under the
Governmental Immunity Act of the State of Utah before she in fact
filed her action.

The school board then raised the statute of

limitations as a defense.

The Utah Supreme Court, speaking on

that issuef said:
"Even if the one-year limitation of Section 63-30-15 be
deemed mandatory, this court has previously held: . . .
Waiver or estoppel may be found in the face of a mandatory
statute. For instance, statutes of limitation ordinarily are
mandatory both in form and effect. Nevertheless, they may be
waived or the party may be estopped from relying upon them...
"Hence the filing of the claim within ninety days,
while mandatory upon the claimant and a condition precedent to
his cause of action, is nothing more than a procedural
requirement as to the agency, which, as to the claimant may be
excused by estoppel.
"In Benner v. Industrial Ace. Comm., supra, 26 Cal 2d
346, 349, 159 P2d 24, 26, the court said, 'Where, as here, the
delay in commencing action was induced by the conduct of the
party sought to be charged the latter may not invoke such
conduct to defeat recovery. An estoppel may arise although
there was no designed fraud on the part of the person sought
to be estopped. Where the delay in commencing action is
induced by the conduct of the defendant, it cannot be availed
of by him as a defense.1"

_Q_

Minnesota has held that estoppel is available in
mechanic's lien cases. The case of Beltline Brick Company v.
Standard Home Building Company, 213 NW 41 (Minn. 1927) is on all
fours with the instant case although labeled without justification
by the lower court as an "aberration."
In the Beltline case the plaintiff furnished brick for
the construction of a building owned by defendant's predecessor in
title.
lien.

Defendant claimed that plaintiff had not timely filed the
The court stated in that case:

"The court found that there was an implied agreement
between the parties, arising out of such transaction, to
extend the time for filing a lien statement, that the
building company is, by its conduct estopped to assert or
contend that such brick was not furnished for use upon the
premises or that the lien statement was filed too late, and
that the defendant, Ella T. Robitschek, is a grantee after
the filing of said lien statement, is also subject to such
estoppel. Upon these matters the evidence amply sustains
the findings and the findings support the conclusion."
Judge Davidson, although claiming in the body of the
opinion that he does not reach the estoppel issue, nevertheless
reaches it in Footnote 1.

When he there condemns Daniels for

"failure to properly preserve the lien right," he decides that
Daniels has no estoppel rights.

The majority of the Court of

Appeals do not concur in that reasoning, but rather affirm the
lower court without opinion (which is error in and of itself—see
Point III), and that necessarily constitutes an affirmance of all
findings and adjudications of the lower court.

See Carr v.

Hoffman, 256 NY 254, 176 NE 383, at page 390 (Ct of Appeals of NY,
1931).

See also Cushman v. Day, 602 P.2d 327 (Oregon 1979).

_i n _

One of the necessary rulings of the lower court was that
Daniels had no estoppel claim against Deseret Federal because of
lack of privity.

The fact that the opinion is designated for

publication indicates that the panel wants the public and the
business and legal community to have the opinion to govern their
affairs, and the opinion case thus stands for the proposition that
estoppel is not available in mechanic's lien cases, at least as
against a party who does not do the act giving rise to the
estoppel.

This is error, and error in a special and important

area of commerce, to-wit, the building industry and the financing
industry.

The matter is one of first impression in Utah, and

ought to be decided by this court.
POINT I.B.

IS A SUBSEQUENT LENDER WHO DERIVED HIS TRUST

DEED INTEREST FROM THE AFORESAID OWNER AFTER THE RECORDING OF THE
SAID MECHANIC'S LIEN, LIKEWISE SUBJECT TO THE SAME ESTOPPEL?
In the lower court Judge Fishier held estoppel
unavailable as there was no "privity" between Deseret Federal and
Daniels.

Affirmance without a majority opinion is an affirmance

of that ruling.
It seems clear that anyone holding through the original
owner ijs in privity with that owner.

One owner can only obtain

his interest from a prior one, and Deseret Federal can only
acquire its trust deed rights from the owner.

-i l -

In Smith vs. Oregon Shortline Railroad Co,, 30 Ut 246, 84 P
108 (1906), the Utah Supreme Court held that a subsequent owner is
estopped by the conduct of his predecessor in title:
" . . . if respondent's grantor at the time of his
conveyance was estopped from maintaining an action of
ejectment for the additional strips taken, then likewise is
the respondent estopped from maintaining such action."
If a lender holding under the owner is not put on notice
by the recording of the mechanic's lien, the protection of the
recording act (Section 5 7-3-2, UCA) is seriously undermined, if
not destroyed.

No affidavit was filed by Deseret Federal denying

actual notice, and therefore actual notice must be deemed
established for purposes of Deseret Federal's Motion to Dismiss.
The Court of Appeals holds at least that a lender can
totally ignore a written mechanic's lien of which it has
constructive and actual notice if the validity of lien rests upon
estoppel.

The holding implies that the lender has no duty of

inquiry, which seriously undermines the recording statute, and is
a matter which requires the attention of this court as being an
important question of state law in accordance with Rule 43(4).
Also, although there is no Utah case precisely on point,
we believe that up until now, in the light of the decisions of
this court uniformly upholding the letter and spirit of the
recording act [See for example Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Ut 55, 1 P2d
242 (1931)], it has been generally assumed that one taking subject
to a recorded mechanic's lien took subject to whatever the holder
of that lien was able to prove for it. That no longer appears to

_1 0_

be the case. We respectfully submit that this circumstance brings
the case within the provisions of Rule 43(2) of this court as
being "in conflict" with decisions of this court.
POINT II.A.

ON APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT

ON MOTION TO DISMISS (WHICH WAS DENOMINATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY
THE LOWER COURT), THE COURT OF APPEALS CANNOT DETERMINE AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT SUMS PAYABLE TO GENERAL CONTRACTOR PURSUANT TO
"COST-PLUS" BUILDING CONTRACT WERE "INVESTOR PROFITS" AND NOT
LIENABLE, RATHER THAN FOR SERVICES AND MATERIALS FURNISHED ON THE
JOB, WHICH ARE LIENABLE.
We respectfully submit that the opinion of Judge
Davidson holding as a matter of law that the $80,000 owing to
Daniels under the cost-plus Building Contract Agreement was
investment money clearly falls within Rule 43(3), which provides:
"When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a
decision that has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings . . . as to call
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision."
It is axiomatic that on a motion to dismiss every
alleged fact and reasonable inference therefrom must be construed
in favor of the party against whom the motion to dismiss is
asserted.

The issue of whether or not the $80,000 was profit or

money owing to Daniels for labor and materials performed on the
job was never even raised in the lower court.
by Judge Davidson.

It was first raised

It is a matter that was not argued to, nor

found by Judge Fishier, and Daniels has never had an opportunity
to meet it.

In his pleadings and in his lien Daniels alleges that

-l -*-

he seeks recovery for labor and materials furnished.

If it is

necessary to affirmatively allege that he does not seek investor
profits, then he should be allowed to amend.
Daniels invested in the joint venture (Park Avenue
Development Company) not in his own name, but only by virtue of
being a limited partner in JML, one of the joint venturers of the
development.

How Judge Davidson was able to say that the Building

Contract Agreement which was executed in Daniels' own name is
somehow investment money due him as such as a limited partner of a
limited partnership of which he is only one member is
incomprehensible.
If there is any ambiguity in the Building Contract, then
Daniels should be able to submit parol evidence to explain it. It
is clear that the Building Contract Agreement is nothing more than
a "cost-plus" contract, and it is clear that "cost-plus" contracts
are lienable.

Any contract for improvements to real property

involves out-of-pocket costs, overhead and profit to the
contractor.

Any contractor who attempts to charge only for out-of-

pocket will soon be bankrupt.

Where Daniels completed the

contract, and in so doing expended the out-of-pocket $757,000 (the
"cost" part of "cost-plus"), he was entitled to the "plus" part of
the "cost-plus of $80,253 as agreed by the parties.

See Mathis v.

Thunderbird Village, Inc., 236 Oregon 425, 389 P2d 343 (1964) and
also 53 Am Jur 2d, Mechanic's Liens, Section 107.
court said:

_ 1

>1_

In Mathis the

"We held there that that portion of the overhead
expense attributable to the job could be included in
determining the reasonable value of the labor for the
job. The issue here is not reasonable value, but
contract price, computed upon a cost-plus basis, and we
cannot observe any distinction when considering the
question of lienability."
Judge Davidson's conclusion that Daniels is seeking
investor profits is totally unjustified.

Daniels in his lien and

in his pleadings asks compensation for labor and materials. The
contract provides that he is to be paid sixty days after
completion.
sold.

Investors will not be paid until the condominiums are

In Footnote 1 Judge Davidson acknowledges that he does not

know what overhead consists of.

Daniels was not required on

Motion to Dismiss, where the issue was not raised, to plead any
detail as to overhead.

The $15,000 which Daniels received was

received for his actual labor on the job and is not part of the
$80,000 which he was to receive for overhead and for the
responsibility he assumed as general contractor.

Certainly the

court cannot say as a matter of law that no part of the $80,253 is
recoverable.

Daniels is

entitled to develop that subject

factually before the appellate court rules as a matter of law that
he has absolutely no rights.
POINT II.B.

JUDGE DAVIDSON ERRONEOUSLY ELIMINATES

OWNERS, AS A CLASS, FROM MECHANIC'S LIEN RIGHTS.
In disqualifying Daniels from lien rights by virtue of
his position as a limited partner as a matter of law, Judge
Davidson appears to be eliminating owners, as a class, from being

able to assert mechanic's lien rights, without citing any case law
or statutory law supporting that conclusion.

Judge Davidson's

conclusions effectively rewrite construction contracts, and it
also rewrites the lien statute, apparently eliminating therefrom
any lien protection for anyone with any ownership interest in a
project.
It is obvious that this distinction opens a whole new
field to unscrupulous developers who now, by using the contract
vehicle of sharing small percentages of ownership with contractors
and thereby allowing them to participate in "profits," can by that
device unwittingly destroy the contractor's (or subcontractor's)
lien rights. The potential for fraud seems unlimited.
Judge Davidson's opinion purports to disqualify a whole
class of citizens from the benefits of the mechanic's lien statute
without the benefit of any safeguards.

In the past such major

changes, if undertaken by the legislature, had the benefit of the
lobbying process and multiple hearings and readings before such a
change became law.

Even changes through the courts in the past

have been accomplished by full briefing, argument and full
consideration on the part of the court.

Judge Davidson's decision

dispenses with all of the foregoing safeguards. A matter of such
importance deserves full consideration and a decision by the
Supreme Court of Utah.
POINT III. DOES THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
WRITTEN BY JUDGE DAVIDSON IN WHICH THE OTHER TWO JUDGES ON THE

_1 C
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PANEL CONCUR IN THE RESULT, BUT WRITE NO OPINIONS, SATISFY THE
REQUIREMENT OF RULE 30(c)f RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
REQUIRING THE "REASONS" FOR THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS TO BE SET FORTH IN WRITING?
Rule 30(c), Rules of Utah Court of Appeals provides:
"When a judgment, decree, or order is reversed,
modified, or affirmed by the court, the reasons therefor
shall be stated concisely in writing and filed with the
clerk. Any judge on the panel concurring or dissenting
therefrom may likewise give the reasons in writing and
file the same with the clerk. . . " (Emphasis added.)
We respectfully submit that under the circumstances of
this case the court has not complied with that rule inasmuch as no
majority opinion has been written, nor have a majority of the
court written separate opinions. We believe this falls within the
purview of Rule 43(3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court with
respect to writs of certiorari and constitutes a circumstance
where the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that has "so
far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings as to call for the exercise of this court's power of
supervision."

Rule 30(c) requires the Court of Appeals to set out

in writing the "reasons" for its decision.
We respectfully submit that it is not proper for the
majority of the court to concur in the result and thereby avoid
writing an opinion setting forth their reasons.
We respectfully submit that if the two concurring
members of the court were in agreement as to the reasons for
denying Daniels' appeal, their reasons should be set forth in

-l 7-

writing as the majority opinion of the court.

If their reasons

differed from the reasons set forth by Judge Davidson, which one
must assume in this casef and their reasons also differed from
each other, then we submit that both should have set forth those
reasons, but in any event one member of the court would have to do
so in order to have the reasons of any majority of the court set
forth in writing.

Anything less than that does not comply with

the requirements of Rule 30(c) that "reasons be set forth in
writing."

The word "reasons" can only mean the reasons of the

majority of the court.
To fail to state its reasons is not only error, but is a
very unfortunate omission in the proper administration of justice.
It conveys a bad image to the unfortunate recipient of such a
"decision" and to the public.

It gives the impression that the

law is arbitrary and unreasoned and that all men are not after all
equal before the law.

It gives the impression that some men get

the benefit of the full, careful and reasoned application of the
law to their case, but that others, for no stated reason, do not.
This case is not trivial.
issues.

It presents substantial

When a litigant is deprived of $80,000, fair play

requires that he be told why.

It deals with matters of first

impression in Utah and of great moment to the building industry
and to the public in general.
The Court of Appeals has clearly decided that it is not
required to comply with Rule 30(c), but can depart therefrom.

_1 O —

This seems to suggest that rules are for the public, and even the
lawyers, but not for the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, pursuant
to Rule 43(4) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, by acting as it has, has "decided an important question
of state law which should be settled by this court," to-wit:

Is

the Court of Appeals bound by its own rules?
This court has jurisdiction to make rules for all of the
courts of the state (Article VIII, Section 4, Constitution of
Utah), and such rules should be followed.
Rule 2 of the Court of Appeals appears to allow the
court to "suspend" a rule and "order proceedings in that case in
accordance with its direction" for the sole purpose of "expediting
a decision."

There was however no such order entered, nor any

showing of any urgency to expedite the decision.

Furthermore,

even if the decision needed to be expedited, it could have been
rendered and the opinion setting forth reasons filed later. The
Court of Appeals may, under Rule 2, be able in its discretion to
vary its procedure in a given case in the interest of justice, but
such discretion is not unlimited and must be exercised in an
orderly manner so that this court can review it.

It is one thing

to "order" that in a given situation a rule be dispensed with for
good cause stated.

It is another thing to just ignore a rule.

Publication of the opinion demonstrates that this is not a trivial
case.

-1 Q -

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the foregoing arguments
demonstrate that the issues here involve special and important
questions of state law which have not been, but should be, settled
by this court.

As to the recording act issue, the decision

appears to be at variance with prior decisions of this court, and
the decision of the Court of Appeals so far departs from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and conduct as
to call for the exercise of this court's power of supervision, and
that this court should accordingly grant the writ.
Respectfully submitted:

GORDON A. MADSEN
ROBERT C. GUMMINGS
Attorneys for Petitioner,
Jack C. Daniels

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that four copies of the foregoing Petition for
Writ of Certiorari were mailed to David R. Olsen, Carl F. Hueffner
and Charles P. Sampson, attorneys for the respondent, Deseret
Federal Savings & Loan, at their address, 175 South West Temple,
#700, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101, postage prepaid, the

day of May, 1989.

Attorney for Petitioner
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APPENDIX
Controlling provisions of Constitution, statutes,
ordinances and regulations continued from Paragraph E,
Page 3.
Section 38-1-3, UCA (1981/82 version)
Section 38-1-7, UCA (1981/82 version)
Section 57-3-2, UCA (1981/82 version)
Opinion of Court of Appeals
Order of Court of Appeals denying Petition for Rehearing
Memorandum Decision of Judge Fishier (R. 233 - 240)
Summary Judgment of Judge Fishier (R. 243 - 245)
Building Contract Agreement of August 14, 1980
Daniels Deposition, Pages 10 - 13, 21 - 23 and 69 - 70
Notice of Lien
Third-party Complaint
Answer and Counterclaim
Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim
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not the type of "benefit" proscribed by §70A3-304(2).
Air Terminal also asserts First Federal knew
the note negotiated by Gump & Ayers was in
breach of duty because First Federal knew the
proceeds were to be used to satisfy the Morse
Shortfall and that Air Terminal was to be
indemnified from the Morse Shortfall under
the Purchase and Security Agreement.
As previously discussed, we consider Air
Terminal's claim for indemnification against
Gump & Ayers and Sunayers as a claim independent of its liability on the note. Despite
the indemnity provisions, Gump & Ayers had
the right to assign Air Terminal's negotiable
note for the benefit of Sunayers, and did not
breach its fiduciary duty in doing so. The
assignment of the note does not vitiate Air
Terminal's claim of indemnification against
Gump & Ayers and Sunayers for funds expended to satisfy the Morse Shortfall. In
summary, we do not find §70A-3-304(2)
defeats First Federal's status as a holder in
due course.
We hold that the Air Terminal note is a
negotiable instrument and First Federal is a
holder in due course. The judgment of the
trial court is, therefore, reversed, and the case
is remanded for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Richard C. Davidson, Juugc
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OPINION
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Jack C. Daniels appeals from a summary
judgment in favor of Deseret Federal Savings
& Loan Association, dismissing his notice to
hold and claim a lien on property for which he
was both a co-owner and the general contractor. Daniels' claim concerned the timeliness
of filing his notice and the profits owed to
him as a limited partner in Park Avenue
Development Company ("Park Avenue"). The
trial court held that his lien was both untimely
and invalid. We affirm.

FACTS
In 1980, Daniels invested approximately
$28,000 in the development of an eight-unit
condominium project in Park City, Utah,
thereby acquiring an interest through a limited
1. Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-304(l)(b), the pro- partnership in Park Avenue. The agreement
vision at issue in this case, is identical to §3- between Park Avenue and Daniels provided
304{l)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code referred that Daniels would receive approximately
to by the court in Sundsvallsbankcn.
$80,000 for his share in the profits from the
sale of the condominiums and for overhead.
Park Avenue also hired Daniels to serve as the
general contractor for the condominium
Cheat
project and agreed to pay him approximately
105 Utah Adv. Rep. 30
$15,000 for his services.
On August 14, 1980, Deseret approved a
IN THE
construction
loan to Park Avenue and constUTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ruction on the project commenced. By the end
of July 1981, Daniels had completed all of the
Jack C. DANIELS,
construction required pursuant to the constrThird-Party Plaintiff and Appellant,
uction contract and Park City issued certific••
ates
of final inspection and occupancy for the
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
project. Daniels was paid $15,000 for services
ASSOCIATION, A-One Construction, Inc.,
and labor, but was not paid his promised
Miller Brick Sales, Eugene E. Dpms, and
share of the profits from the sale of the conMichael R. McCoy,
dominiums.
Respondent.
Apparently, Daniels intended to file a notice
to
hold and claim a lien on the project, for the
CEN Corporation,
$80,000 "profit/ within the statutory period
Plaintiff,
required for filing. However, the owners of
•.
the project were trying to obtain refinancing
Jack C. Daniels, Debra Estes, Scott Berry,
and they requested Daniels not to file his
Debra Ann Sitzberger, and Amy Stanton
mechanic's lien for the profit and overhead.
Eagleson,
I In return, the owners promised Daniels that
I they would allocate his share of the profits to
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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him within two weeks. In reliance on this
promise, Daniels did not file his mechanic's
lien within the requisite 100 day period.
However, the promised payment was not
made.
On December 1, 1981, several water pipes in
the condominiums froze. The owners called
Daniels to inspect the pipes and to make
repairs. Daniels inspected the pipes and made
phone calls to subcontractors in order to facilitate repairs. On February 3, 1982, Daniels
filed a notice of lien against the project, claiming a lien for the $80,000 'profit.* He listed
December 1, 1981, as the last day labor had
been furnished on the project.
In October 1983, Daniels filed a complaint
against Deseret to foreclose his claimed lien on
the property. Deseret's construction loan to
Park Avenue was secured by deeds of trust
which Deseret executed February 22, 1982,
and recorded March 1, 1982. Deseret subsequently moved to dismiss Daniels' complaint
on the basis that Daniels' lien was not filed in
a timely fashion as required by Utah Code
Ann. §38-1-7 (1988) and therefore, Daniels
had no cause of action as a matter of law.
CEN Corporation, subsequent owner of the
real property, also moved to declare Daniels'
lien void. The trial court agreed that Daniels
had not timely filed a mechanic's lien and
therefore granted summary judgment in favor
of Deseret and CEN Corporation.
Daniels raises two issues on appeal: Did the
trial court err when it found Daniels' work on
December 1, 1981, did not extend the time
limit for filing a notice to hold and claim a
lien? Did the trial court err when it held
Deseret is not estopped from raising the affirmative defense that the mechanic's lien was
not timely filed?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may grant summary judgment if the
evidence shows "that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
l a w / Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because a
summary judgment is a matter of law, the
appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions no particular deference but rather applies
the same standard as that applied by the trial
court. Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283
(Utah App. 1987). However, *[o]n appeal
from a summary judgment, we review the
evidence in a light most favorable to the losing
party." Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737
P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Geneva Pipe Co.
v. S& H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah
1986).

related series of tasks required for substantial
completion of the contract. "Trivial or minor
adjustments made casually or long after the
main work is completed cannot be used to tie
on to as the last labor done or materials furnished." Wilcox v. Ooward, 88 Utah 503, 56
P.2d 1,6-7(1936).
Well over 100 days after completion of the
contract, Daniels spent a day inspecting the
damage from the frozen water pipes and
calling subcontractors in order to make
repairs. Daniels contends that this extends the
period for filing his mechanic's lien. However,
the trial court found:
The work the owners wanted done
in December of 1981 was not a
continuation of the earlier project,
but merely repairs. If repairs to a
completed project could be construed as extending the time in which
a mechanic's lien could be filed,
mechanic's (sic] liens could be filed
many years after a project had been
completed.
We agree with the trial court's findings. In
order to extend the time for filing his mechanic's lien, the work Daniels did in December
1981 would have to substantially relate to the
performance of the contract. "The work done
or material furnished must be something
substantial in connection with the performance
of the contract and this is not satisfied by
trivialties which may be used as a pretext to
extend the lien period." Palombi v. D A C
Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325, 327
(1969).
In Palombi, the original contractor argued
that the date of completion was the date on
which the building permit was obtained and
some remaining building materials were
removed from the property owner's residence.
The court held that these were trivial activities
in light of the substantial completion of the
contract, and they could not be used to extend
the date of completion. Similarly, the inspection and repairs undertaken by Darnels in
December 1981 were not services used in the
construction, alteration, or improvement of
the building, nor did the services add directly
to the value of the property. Therefore, the
inspection cannot extend the time period for
filing notice of a mechanic's lien.

TIME OF FILING - EXTENSION
A general contractor must record a mechanic's lien within 100 days after completion of
the contract. Utah Code Ann. §38-1-7
(1988), Completion is marked by the end of a
UTAH ADVAN<

SERVICES AND MATERIALS FURNISHED
Daniels contends that Park Avenue and
subsequent owners are estopped from pleading
untimely filing of the notice of the lien as an
affirmative defense because he was induced by
the project owners not to file a lien within the
requisite 100 day filing period. Deseret contends that it had no knowledge of the agreement between Park Avenue and Daniels and
that it was not in privity with Daniels. Therefore, Deseret argues, estoppel cannot be
REPORTS
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asserted against it.
We do not need to reach the merits of the
estoppel argument. Even if Daniels had filed a
timely notice for the $80,000 owing to him for
"profit and overhead," this amount was not
owed to him for the value of the services he
rendered or for materials furnished but from
his ownership in Park Avenue as a limited
partner. Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3 (1988)
provides that contractors, subcontractors, and
laborers who furnish material, provide services, or bestow labor for the contraction, alteration, or improvement of a building or structure shall have a lien upon the property for
the value of the services and material provided. The value of the services provided by
Daniels in his performance as general contractor, was approximately $15,000, for which he
was compensated.1
The purpose of the mechanic's lien law "is
to preclude landowners from having their
lands improved by others, without becoming
personally responsible for the reasonable value
of materials and labor." Cox Rock Prod. v.
Walker Pipeline Constr., 754 P.2d 672 (Utah
App. 1988). In order to ascertain when an
improvement has been made upon the land,
for purposes of determining whether notice of
a mechanic's lien can validly be filed, it is
necessary that "there be an annexation to the
land, or to some part of the realty; or a
fixture appurtenant to it, and this must have
been done with the intention of making it a
permanent part thereof." King Bros., Inc. v.
Utah Dry Kiln Co., 374 P.2d 254, 256 (Utah
1962).
Daniels' claim is for the profits he was
entitled to as an investor and not for any
services or materials that he provided as a
contractor. The profits a person is entitled to
as the result of an investment do not constitute improvements to the realty nor do they
fall within the statutory meaning of services or
materials as contemplated in the mechanic's
lien law statutes. Accordingly, Daniels' notice
to hold and claim a lien, for the profits allegedly owing to him, is invalid. Therefore, the
summary judment in favor of Deseret is affirmed.
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
WE CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-104(1 Kb), the provision at issue in this case, is identical to §3304(l)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code referred
to by the court in Sundsvallsbankea.
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MECHANICS AND OTHER LIENS
CHAPTER 169
H. B. No. 51

(Passed February 19, 1981. In effect May 12. 1981.)

MECHANICS' LIEN MODIFICATIONS
AN ACT RELATING TO LIENS; PROVIDING THAT AN AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF A
COPY OF THE NOTICE OF INTENT TO CLAIM A LIEN UPON THE OWNER OF THE
LIENED PROPERTY BE FILED WITH THE COUNTY RECORDER AT THE TIME SUCH
NOTICE IS FILED.
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 38-1-7, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS LAST
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 143, LAWS OF UTAH 1979.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Section amended.
Section 38-1-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter
143, Laws of Utah 1979, is amended to read:
38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents—Recording—Service on owner of property.
Every original contractor within 100 days after the completion of his contract, and except as hereafter provided, every person other than the original
contractor claiming the benefit of this chapter within 80 days after furnishing
the last material or performing the last labor for or on any land, building,
improvement or structure, or for any alteration, addition to or repair thereof,
or performance of any labor in, or furnishing any materials for, any mine or
mining claim, must file for record with the county recorder of the county in
which the property, or some part thereof, is situated a claim in writing, containing a notice of intention to hold and claim a lien, and a statement of his
demand after deducting all just credits and offsets, with the name of the
reputed owner if known or if not known, the name of the record owner, and
also the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he furnished the material, with a statement of the terms, time given and conditions
of his contract, specifying the time when the first and last labor was performed, or the first and last material was furnished, and also a description of
the property to be charged with the lien, sufficient for identification, which
claim must be verified by the oath of himself or of some other person. Within
30 days after filing said notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail
by certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of the real
property a copy of the said notice of lien. Where the record owner's current
address is not readily available, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the
last known address of the record owner using for such purpose the names and
addresses appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of
the county where the affected property is located. Failure to deliver or mail
the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner shall prevent the lien
claimant from collection of interest or costs and attorneys* fees against the
reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien.
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When a subcontractor or any person furnishes labor or material as stated
above at the instance and request of an original contractor, then such subcontractor's or person's lien rights, as set forth herein, are extended so as to
make the final date for the filing of a notice of intention to hold and claim a
lien 80 days after completion of the original contract of the original contractor.
Approved March 24, 1981.

CHAPTER 170
H. B. No. 191

(Passed March 5, 1981. In effect May 12. 1981.)

MECHANIC'S LIENS » ITEMS COVERED
AN ACT RELATING TO LIENS; PROVIDING PROTECTION FOR PERSONS WHO RENT
EQUIPMENT OR MATERIALS UNDER THE MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTE.
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 38-1-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 73, LAWS OF UTAH 1973.

1953, AS LAST

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Section amended.
Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last,amended by Chapter
73, Laws of Utah 1973, is amended to read:
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien—What may be attached—Lien on ores mined.
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing any services or furnishing oi renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any
premises in any manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish materials
for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed architects and
engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who
have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a
lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service,
performed labor or furnished or rented materialsf-,] or equipment for the
value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials or equipment
furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner
or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall attach only to such interest as the owner may have in
the property, but the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit,
whether working under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes of this chapter include products mined and excavated while the same remain upon the
premises included within the lease.
Approved March 27, 1981.

TITLE 57—REAL ESTATE
Chapter
3. Recording Conveyances, 57-3-2.
8. Condominium Ownership Act, 57-8-3, 57-8-6, 57-8-7, 57-8-10, 57-8-13,
57-8-13.2, 57-8-13.4, 57-S-13.6, 57-8-13.8, 57-8-13.10, 57-8-13.12, 57-813.14, 57-8-16.5, 57-8-18, 57-8-24, 57-8-27, 57-8-32.5, 57-8-35, 57-8-36.
13. Solar Easements, 57-1 :M. 57-13-2.
14. Limitation of Landowner Liability—Public Recreation, 57-14-1 to
57-14-7.
CHAPTER

57-1-3.

1—CONVEYANCES

Grant of fee simple presumed.

Condemnation judgment.
Fee simple title is presumed to be papsed
by a condemnation judgment. Olsen v.

Board of Education of Granite School Disk,
5*71 P. 2d 1336.

57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice, etc.
Forged deed.
The recording of a forged deed gives no
notice as to its contents and a bona fide

purchaser from the person who forged the
deed takes nothing. Rasmussen v. Olsen,
583 P. 2d CO.

57-1-10. After-acquired title passes.
After-acquired interest.
Assignment to grantor of rights under
an outstanding lease of property at time
of conveyance, after grantor had purported
to convey the entire fee of such property

CHAPTER

by warranty deed to grantee, gave grantor
rights under the outstanding lease and
rights passed to grantee at time
of
tj l ° assignment. Cox v. Ney, 580 P . 2d
1083.

n0

n11 s u c h

2—ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

57-2-1. Manner of acknowledging or proving conveyances.
Comparable Provisions.
Jurisdictions which have enacted the
Uniform Acknowledgment Act are Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,

Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshiie, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennbylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Virgin
Islands, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyommg.

CHAPTER 3—RECORDING CONVEYANCES
Section
57-3-2. Record imparts notice.

57-3-2. Record imparts notice.—Every conveyance, or instrument in
writing affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved, and certified, in the manner prescribed by this title, and every patent to lands within
this state duly executed and verified according to law, and every judgment,
73
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order or decree of any court of record in this stale, or a copy thereof, required by law to be recorded in the office of the county recorder, and every
financing statement which complies witli the provisions of section 70A-9402 shall, from the time of filing the same with the recorder for record,
impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof; and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and take
with notice.
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, §2000;
C. L. 1917, §4900; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-3-2; L. 1977, ch. 272, § 54.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1977 amendment inserted "and
every financing statement which complies
with the provisions of section 70A-9-402"
in the middle of the section; and made a
minor change in punctuation.
Forged deed.
The recording of a forged deed gives no

notice a? to its contents and a bona fide
purchaser from the person who forged a
deed takes nothing. Rasmussen v. Olsen,
583 P. 2d 50.
Priorities.
Where deeds involved in two separate
conveyances contained descriptions of
land that overlapped, party who first recorded notice of purchase prevailed. Wilson v. Schneiter's Riverside Golf Course,
503 P 2 d 122Q.

CHAPTER 5—PLATS AND SUBDIVISIONS

57-5-1.

Laying out land into blocks, lots and streets—Lawful.

Law Eeviews.
Preserving Utah's Open Spaces, Owen
Olpin, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 164.

57-5-3.

Maps and plats to be acknowledged, etc.

Approval under council-mayor form of
government.
Under a council-mayor form of government, approval of subdivision plat by
mayor pursuant to an ordinance adopted

by city council providing for such approval
satisfies the approval requirements of this
section. Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P . 2d
1022.

CHAPTER 8—CONDOMINIUM O W N E R S H I P ACT
Section
57-8-3.
57-8-6.
57-8-7.
•
57-8-10.
57-8-13.
57-S-13.2.
57-8-13.4.
57-8-13.6.
57-8-13.8.
57-8-13.10.
57-8-13.12.
57-8-13.14.
57-8-16.5.
57-8-18.
57-8-24.
57-8-27.

Definitions.
Ownership of units.
Common areas and facilities.
Contents of declaration.
Record of survey map to be recorded.
Conversion of convertible land—Amendment to declaration—Limitations.
Conversion of convertible spnee—Amendment to declaration—'Limitations.
Expansion of project.
Contraction of project.
Condominiums containing convertible land—Expandable oondominiams—
Allocation of interests in common areas and facilities—Requirements.
Land to bo withdrawn or added to project—Applicability of restrictions.
Easement rights—Sales offices and model units—Damage to property.
Appointment and removal of committee and association members—Scope of
authority—Period of control—Renewal of contracts—Failure to establish
association or committee—Section construed in unit owners' favor.
Blanket mortgages and other blanket liens affecting unit at time of first
conveyance.
Common profits and expenses.
Separate taxation.
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Rule 28

RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

with this rule, they will nnt be filed, but shall be
returned to be properly pi°pared
(b) Form of other papers.
(1) Petitions for rehearing. Petitions for rehearing shall be produced in the manner prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, including
the color requirements
(2) Motions. Motions and other papers shall
be typewritten upon opaque, ungla^ed paper 8V2
by 11 inches in size Lines of tne typewritten text
shall be double spaced and shall be typed on only
one side of the paper Consecutive sheets shall be
attached at the upper left margin
(3) Caption A motion or other paper shall
contain a caption setting forth the name of the
court, the title o£ the case, the docket number,
and a bnef descriptive title indicating the purpose of the paper
(c) Signature. Briefs, petitions, motions, and other
papers shall be signed by counsel of record or by a
party who is without counsel
Rule 28. Prehearing conference.
The court may direct the attorney s for the parties
to appear before a panel of the court, a judge, or an
appointed referee thereof for a prehearing conference
to consider the simplification of the issues and such
other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
proceeding by the court The court, judge, or appointed referee shall make an order which recites the
action taken at the conference and the agreements
made by the parties as to any of the matters considered and which limits the issues to those not disposed
of by admissions or agreements of counsel, and such
order when entered controls the subsequent course of
the proceeding unless modified to prevent manifest
injustice
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agree or the court otherwise directs If sepaiate appellants support the bame argument care shall be
taken to avoid duplication of argument
(e) N o n a p p e a r a n c e of p a r t i e s If the respondent
fails to appear to present arg iment the roart will
hear argument on behalf of the appellant it present
If the appellant fails to apuear the court maj hear
argument on behalf of the respondent if present If
neither party appears, the case will be decided en the
briefs unless the court shall otherwise order
(f) S u b m i s s i o n o n briefs. By agreement of the
parties, a cas^ may be submitted for decision on the
bnefs but the court may direct that the case be argued
(g) Use of p h y s i c a l exhibits a t a r g u m e n t , removal. If physical exhibits other than documents are
to be used at the argument counsel shall arrange to
have them placed in the courtroom before the court
convenes on the date of the argument After the argument, counsel shall cause the exhibits to be remo\ ed
from the courtroom unless the court otherwise directs If exhibits are not reclaimed by counsel within
a reasonable time after notice is given by the clerk,
they shall be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the
clerk shall think best
Rule 30. Decision of the court: Dismissal, notice
of decision.
(a) Decision in civil c a s e s . The court may reverse affirm, or modify any order or judgment appealed from If the findings of fact in a case are incomplete, the court may order the trial court or
agency to supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them conform to the issues presented
and the facts as found from the evidence and may
direct the trial court or agency to enter judgment m
accordance with the findings as revised The court
may also order a new trial or further proceedings to
be conducted If a new trial is granted tne court may
pass upon and determine all questions of liw involved m the case presented apon the appeal and necessary to the final determination of the case
(b) Decision in c r i m i n a l cases. If a judgment of
conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless
otheiwise specified by the court If a ludgmtnt of conviction or other order is affirmed or modified by the
court the judgment or order affirmed or modified
shall be executed
,
\
(c) Decision a n d o p i n i o n m writing, e n t r y of
I decision. When a judgment decree or order is re
I versed, modifi* d, or affirmed by the court the reasons
J therefor shall be stated concisely in writing and filed
I with the clerk Any judge on the panel concurrirsr or
J dissenting therefrom may likewise give the reasons
I in writing and file the same with the clerk The entry
I by the clerk in the records of the court shall consti
J t u t e the entry of the judgment of the court
(d) Notice of decision Immediately upon the
entry of the decision the clerk shall give notice
thereof to the respective parties and make the decision public

Rule 29. Oral a r g u m e n t
(a) In general. Oral argument will be allowed in
all cases unless the court concludes
(1) the appeal is frivolous,
(2) the dispositive issue or set of issues has
been recently authoritatively decided, or
(3) the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the brief and record and the
decisional process would not be significantly
aided by oral argument
(b) Notice b y clerk and request by a party for
a r g u m e n t ; postponement. Not later than 30 days
prior to the term of court in which a case is to be
submitted, the clerk shall give notice to all parties
that oral argument is to be permitted if requested
and, if so, the time and place therefor and the time to
be allowed each side Oral argument will not be
scheduled unless a party requests the same in writing
filed with the clerk not later than 15 da>s from the
date of the clerk's notice A request for postponement
of the argument or for allowance of additional time
must be made by motion filed reasonably in advance
of the date fixed for hearing
(c) Order and content of argument. The appel
Rule 3 1 . E x p e d i t e d a p p e a l s d e c i d e d after oral
lant is entitled to open and conclude the argument
a r g u m e n t w i t h o u t w r i t t e n opinion
The opening argument shall include a fair statement
(a) Motion a n d s t i p u l a t i o n for expedited hearof the case Counsel will not be permitted to read at
t i n g After the filing of all briefs in an appeal a party
length from briefs records, or authorities
may move for an expedited decision without a written
(d) Separate and cross-appeals. A separate or
oninion The motion shall be accompanied by a atipu
cross-appeal shall be argued with the initial appeal at
lation signed by all partieb on appeal specifically
a single argument unless the court otherwise directs
agreeing to submit the ca^e for decision without a
If a case involves a cross-appeal, the plaintiff m the
written opinior pursuant to this rule The motion
action below shall be deemed the appellant for the
shall be in the fcrm prescribed by Rule 23 and, in
purpose of this rule unless the parlies otherwise
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DAVIDSON, Judge:
Jack C. Daniels appeals from a summary judgment in favor
of Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association, dismissing his
notice to hold and claim a lien on property for which he was
both a co-owner and the general contractor* Daniels* claim
concerned the timeliness of filing his notice and the profits
owed to him as a limited partner in Park Avenue Development
Company {"Pdih Rifi'inuT), Tin Mill i mil I In Id Mill lii liin
was B&th untimely and invalid. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1980, Daniels invested approximately $28,000 in the
development of an eight-unit condominium project in Park City,
Utah, thereby acquiring an interest through a limited
partnership in Park Avenue. The agreement "between Park Avenue
and Daniels provided that Daniels would receive—approximately
$80,000 for his share in the profits from th^sale of the
condominiums and for overhead. Park Avenue aSLs&~-ftired Daniels
to serve as the general contractor for the condominium project
and agreed to pay him approximately $15,000 for his services.
On August 14, 1980, Deseret approved a construction loan
to Park Avenue and construction on the project commenced. By
the end of July 1981, Daniels had completed all of the
construction required pursuant to the construction contract and
Park City issued certificates of final inspection and occupancy
for the project. Daniels was paid $15,000 for services and
labor, but was not paid his promised share of the profits-from
the sale of the condominiums.
Apparently, Daniels intended to file a notice to hold and
claim a lien on the project, for the $80,000 "profit," within
the statutory period required for filing. However, the owners
of the project were trying to obtain refinancing and they
requested Daniels hot to file his mechanic's lien for the
profit and overhead. In return, the owners promised Daniels
that they would allocate his share of the profits to him within
two weeks. In reliance on this promise, Daniels did not file
his mechanic's lien within the requisite 100 day period.
However, the promised payment was not. made.
On December 1, 1981, several water pipes in the
condominiums froze. The owners called Daniels to inspect the
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pipes and to make repairs. Daniels inspected the pipes and
made phone calls to subcontractors in order to facilitate
repairs. On February 3, 1982, Daniels filed a notice of lien
against the project, claiming a lien for the $80,000 "profit."
He listed December 1, 1981, as the last day labor had been
furnished on the project.
In October 1983, Daniels filed a complaint against Deseret
to foreclose his claimed lien on the property. Deseret's
construction loan to Park Avenue was secured by deeds of trust
which Deseret executed February 22, 1982, and recorded March 1,
1982. Deseret subsequently moved to dismiss Daniels• complaint
on the basis that Daniels1 lien was not filed in a timely
fashion as required by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (1988) and
therefore, Daniels had no cause of action as a matter of law.
CEN Corporation, subsequent owner of the real property, also
moved to declare Daniels' lien void. The trial court agreed
that Daniels had not timely filed a mechanic's lien and
therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Deseret and CEN
Corporation.
Daniels raises two issues on appeal: Did the trial court
err when it found Daniels* work on December 1, 1981, did not
extend the time limit for filing a notice to hold and claim a
lien? Did the trial court err when it held Deseret is not
estopped from raising the affirmative defense that the
mechanic's lien was not timely filed?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may grant summary judgment if the evidence shows
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because a summary judgment is a
matter of law, the appellate court gives the trial courtfs
conclusions no particular deference but rather applies the same
standard as that applied by the trial court. Briaas v.
Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah App. 1987). However, "[o]n
appeal from a summary judgment, we review the evidence in a
light most favorable to the losing party." Atlas Corp. v.
Clovis- Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Geneva Pipe
Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986).
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TIME OF FILING - EXTENSION
A general contractor must record a mechanic's lien within
100 days after completion of the contract. Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-1-7 (1988). Completion is marked by the end of a related
series of tasks required for substantial completion of the
contract. "Trivial or minor adjustments made casually or long
after the main work is completed cannot be used to tie on to as
the last labor done or materials furnished.19 Wilcox v.
Cloward. 88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1, 6-7 (1936).
Well over 100 days after completion of the contract,
Daniels spent a day inspecting the damage from the frozen water
pipes and calling subcontractors in order to make repairs.
Daniels contends that this extends the period for filing his
mechanic's lien. However, the trial court found:
The work the owners wanted done in
December of 1981 was not a continuation of
the earlier project, but merely repairs.
If repairs to a completed project could be
construed as extending the time in which a
mechanic's lien could be filed, mechanic's
[sic] liens could be filed many years
after a project had been completed.
We agree with the trial court's findings. In order to
extend the time for filing his mechanic's lien, the work
Daniels did in December 1981 would have to substantially relate
to the performance of the contract. -The work done or material
furnished must be something substantia^ J41 connection with the
performance of the contract and thigxfs not^ satisfied by
trivialties which may be used as a/pretext to extend the lien
period.- Palorobi v. P & C B\iilder&e_22^ah 2d 297, 452 P.2d
325, 327 (1969).
In Palombi. the original contractor argued that the date
of completion was the date on which the building permit was
obtained and some remaining building materials were removed
from the property owner's residence. The court held that these
were trivial activities in light of the substantial completion
of the contract, and they could not be used to extend the date
of completion. Similarly, the inspection and repairs
undertaken by Daniels in December 1981 were not services used
in the construction, alteration, or improvement of the
building, nor did the services add directly to the value of the
property. Therefore, the inspection cannot extend the time
period for filing notice of a mechanic's lien.
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SERVICES AND MATERIALS FURNISHED
Daniels contends that Park Avenue and subsequent owners
are estopped from pleading untimely filing of the notice of the
lien as an affirmative defense because he was induced by the
project owners not to file a lien within the requisite 100 day
filing period. Deseret contends that it had no knowledge of
the agreement between Park Avenue and Daniels and that it was
not in privity with Daniels. Therefore/ Deseret argues,
estoppel cannot be asserted against it.
We do not need to reach the merits of the estoppel
argument* Even if Daniels had filed a timely notice for the
$80/000 owing to him for Hprofit and overhead/" this amount was
not owed to him for the value of the services he rendered or
for materials furnished but from his ownership in Park Avenue
as a limited partner. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1988) provides
that contractors/ subcontractors/ and laborers who furnish
material/ provide services/ or bestow labor for the
contruction# alteration/ or improvement of a building or
structure shall have a lien upon the property for the value of
the services and material provided. The value of the services
provided by Daniels in his performance as general contractor,
was approximately $15/000/ for which he was compensated.1
The purpose of the mechanic's lien law H is to preclude
landowners from having their lands improved by others/ without
becoming personally responsible for the reasonable value of
materials and labor." Cox Rock Prod, v. Walker Pipeline
Constr., 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988). In order to ascertain
when an improvement has been made upon the land/ for purposes
of determining whether notice of a mechanic's lien can validly
be filed/ it is necessary that '•there be an annexation to the
land/ or to some part of the realty; or a fixture appurtenant
to it, and this must have been done with the intention of
making it a permanent part thereof." King Bros.. Inc. v. Utah
Dry Kiln Co., 374 P.2d 254/ 256 (Utah 1S62).
Daniels' claim is for the profits he was entitled to as an
investor and not for any services or materials that he provided
1. It is undisputed that approximately $15/000 was paid to
Daniels for his services as contractor. What the "overhead"
represented is unclear. In any case, failure to properly
preserve the lien right precludes any claim that this overhead
should be the subject of a lien.
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as a contractor. The profits a person is entitled to as the
result of an investment do not constitute improvements to the
realty nor do they fall within the statutory meaning of
services or materials as contemplated
in the mechanic's lien
law statutes. Accordingly, Daniels9 notice to hold and claim a
lien, for the profits allegedly owing to him, is invalid.
Therefore, the summary judment in favor of Deseret is affirmed.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge
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UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

Jack> C. Daniels,
Third-Party Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
Deseiret Federal Savinas & Loan
Association, A-One Construction,
Inc., Miller Brick Sales, Eugene
E. Doms and Michael. R. McCoy,
Respondent,
Cen Corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
Jack C. Daniels, Debra Estes,
Scott Berry, Debra Ann Sitzberger
and Amy Stanton Eagleson,
Defendantso

)
)
)

ORDER

)
)
)
)

Case No. 880135-CA

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for
Rehearing filed by the Appellant.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
Dated this 26th day of April, 1989.
FOR THE COURT:

Mary*T/ Noonan
ClerkMsf the Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of April, 1989, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed to each of the
following:
Gordon A.
Robert C.
Attorneys
225 South
Salt Lake

Madsen
Cummings
for Appellant, Daniels
200 East, Suite 150
City, Utah 84111

David R. Olsen
Carl F. Huefner
Charles P. Sampson
Attorneys for Respondent, Deseret Federal
700 Clark Learning Office Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101-1480
Third District Court
Summit County
Civil 6790

Julia C. Whitfield
Case Management Clerk

i.C.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICTMr-££ 5 T RiGSE—.
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CEN CORPORATION,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
CIVIL NO. 6790
vs .
JACK C. DANIELS, et al.,
Defendants.
JACK C. DANIELS,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs .
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Third Party Defendants

This action was brought by the plaintiff to determine among
other things, the validity of a lien filed by defendant Daniels
on February 3, 1982.

Daniels then brought a third party action

against third party defendant Deseret Federal Savings & Loan
Association.
The undisputed facts are that Daniels is a contractor who
performed certain services, and furnished labor and materials used
in the construction of a building on the real property in question,
The project was a condominium located in Summit County, Utah.
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The deposition of Jack Daniels indicates that by the end of July,
1981 all construction pursuant to the Building Contract Agreement
had been completed.

Certificates of Final Inspection and Occupancy

were issued by the City of Park City, Utah.
On or about December 1st of that year, several pipes in the
condominium burst.

The owners of the condominium contacted Daniels,

and requested that he begin the necessary work to make adequate
repairs.

Daniels, as set out in h'is deposition of September 30,

1983, indicates that he contacted several subcontractors in
anticipation of beginning work.

Prior to any work being done on

the project by any contractors or subcontractors, the owners
advised him that he did not need to make the repairs for reasons
best known to themselves.
As indicated above, Daniels filed his mechanic's lien
on February 3, 1982, and shortly thereafter Deseret Federal filed
its Trust Deed.
Daniels also claims that the time in which he could file his
mechanic's lien was extended by virtue of an agreement he had
with the owners.
Deseret Federal now moves to dismiss claiming that Daniels1
mechanic's lien was not timely filed.
Daniels counters by saying that the last work done on the
project was done in December of 1981, and further he was given an
extension of time by the owners in which to file his lien.
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A careful review of the facts shows that the project was
completed in July of 1981, and that the work the owners wanted done
in December of 1981 was not a continuation of the earlier project,
but merely repairs.

If repairs to a completed project could be

construed as extending the time in which a mechanic's lien could
be filed, mechanic's liens could be filed many years after a
project had be^n completed.

Therefore, the lien in question could

relate back only to the amount of work done during December of 1981.
Deseret Tederal, however, claims that the lien is invalid
since no work was actually done by Daniels on the project.

It

is undisputed that no improvements were made to the project, and
that Daniels' only involvement was to contact various subcontractors
and craftsmen.
A close reading of Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended, indicates that there are three distinct categories of
persons who are entitled to file a lien in situations of this type.
Addressing them in reverse order, these persons are licensed
architects, engineers and artisans who furnish designs, plats,
plans and estimates of costs.

The next category are those persons

involved in mining, and the location and/or working of oil and gas
deposits.

The last category, which is mentioned first in the

statute, is the category of contractors, subcontractors and
all other persons.

In this Court's opinion, Daniels falls in

the contractors category.

The only other category he could possibly

4
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fall into would be on the basis that he provided an estimate of
costs.

Construing the deposition of Mr. Daniels in his favor, the

Court must conclude that he was not hired to furnish an estimate of
costs, but rather to make repairs.

This Court believes that the

correct interpretation of the statute is that to fall within the
third category in the statute in question, a person must be one
hired specifically to estimate costs.

To rule otherwise would

mean that a contractor who takes on a job on a cost-plus basis,
and without telling the owner what the cost of the project would be,
would be in one category, whereas the contractor who gave a bid
would fall in another category in the event both were to file a lien
for the work they performed in contacting subcontractors.

To

reach such a result would seem to be nonsensical and absurd.
For this reason, this Court believes that the only conclusion that
can be reached is that Mr. Daniels falls within the first category
mentioned in the statute.
The second and third categories differ from the first category
m

one notable way.

That is the requirement placed upon those

failing within the first category that the services, materials or
equipment must be "used in the construction, alteration or
improvement of any building or structure or improvement."

This

requirement is not typical to the second two categories.
There is a brief statement of the legislative history of
^he predecessor of the statute in question contained in Zions First

*~ o O
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National 3ank vs. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970).
Based upon this legislative history, it would appear that the
distinction between the first category and the second and third
categories is that on many occasions engineers and architects do
a substantial amount of work which does not per se improve the
property, and further is not visible upon an inspection of the
property.

An architect and engineer may work many months in

preparing plans, preparing renderings, and making computations.
In fact, the bulk of the work done by an architect and engineer,
with the exception of supervision, is done off the property site.
This likewise holds true for work done on mining claims for oil
and gas deposits.

A geologist may spend many hours reviewing

maps and locate prior deposits in a neighboring region, and yet
never visit the site.

For these reasons, this Court is of the

opinion that the distinction between the first category and the
second and third categories is a valid one, which takes into account
the problems of those persons involved in the construction and
design of real estate projects, as well as the development of
mining and fossil fuel deposits.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the
opinion that Zions First National Bank vs. Carlson, supra, does
not apply to the facts here.

In Zions First National Bank, the

lien claimant involved fell into the third category rather than
the first.

It is for this reason that the Court stated that the

O '1' /

CEN CORPORATION VS.
DANIELS, ET AL

PAGE SIX

MEMORANDUM DECISION

plans for the erection of a building need not be used in the
erection of the building;
It appears to this Court that since the activities of Daniels
in December of 1981 are not services used in the construction,
alteration, or improvement of the building, nor did the services
add directly to the value of the property, the work done in
December of 1981 cannot extend the time period in which Daniels was
to have filed his lien.

See, Cald'er Brothers vs. Anderson,

652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982) .
Daniels also makes the claim that if the lien was not timely
filed, Deseret Federal is estopped from making that claim since
Daniels had an agreement with the owners which allowed for the
late filing of a lien.

In support of this proposition, Daniels

cites the case of Beltline Brick Company vs. Standard Home Building,
213 N.W. 41 (Minn. 1927).

This seems to be contrary to Utah law.

See, Smith vs. Oregpn Short Line Railroad Company, 30 Utah 246,
84 P. 108 (1906), and Utah Savings and Loan Association vs. Mecham
12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598 (1961).

The court in Smith vs. Oregon,

Short Line, stated that in order to establish an estoppel against
a mortgagee, the lien claimant must establish certain facts.

He

must establish concealment, misrepresentation, an act or
declaration by the mortgagee.

There is no evidence to indicate

that any of these events occurred.

If the law were to the contrary,

it would allow owners and individual mechanic lien claimants to
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determine the priority of other lien claimants, whether they were
other mechanic lien claimants, or holders of trust deeds and
mortgages.

This would create confusion in the law, which would be

intolerable.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the lien
of Daniels is null and void as to Deseret Federal.
Federal's Motion is granted.

Deseret

Counsel for Deseret Federal is

directed to prepare an Order in accordance with this Decision, and
have the Order either approved as to form, or he should adhere
to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courtc
Dated thiis

fep

day of April, 1984
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the following,
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Jeffrey B. Brown
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Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Third Party
Defendant Deseret Federal
Savings and Loan Association
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CEN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
-vJACK C. DANIELS, et al.,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants,
JACK C. DANIELS,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
-vDESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.

Civil No.

6790

&

The motion of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal
Savings & Loan Association came on regularly for hearing
before this Court on March 5, 1984, the Honorable Philip R.
Fishier, District Judge, presiding, George A. Hunt of Snow,
Christensen & Martineau and A. Dean Jeffs of Jeffs & Jeffs
appearing for Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings &
Loan Association and Gordon A. Madsen of Madsen & Cummings
appearing for Third-Party Plaintiff Jack Daniels, and the
Court having heard argument of counsel and having reviewed
the memoranda on file with the Court and having requested
supplemental memoranda from counsel and the same having been
filed, and the deposition of Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Jack C. Daniels having been published and the Court being
fully advised in the premises and having rendered its Memorandum
Decision in the matter on April 6, 1984, granting the motion
of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion
to Dismiss of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings &
Loan Association be and the same hereby is granted and judgment
is rendered in its favor and against Third-Party Plaintiff Jack
C. Daniels, no cause of action.
DATED this

Z{ t .

day of April, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

o •'
«
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TPhilip R. F i s h i e r ,

~2~

District

Judge

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

:

SS.

Kay I. Brown, being duly sworn, deposes and states:
that she is employed in the offices of Snow, Christensen
& Martineau, attorneys for Defendant Deseret Federal Savings
& Loan Association herein; that she served the attached
Summary Judgment, Summit County District Court, Civil No.
6790 upon the following by placing a true and correct copy
thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Gordon Madsen, Esq.
320 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Roger H. Bullock, Esq.
6th Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111
Melvin G. Larew, Jr., Esq.
6914 South 3000 East, #205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
James M. Dean, Esq.
61 South Main, #403
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jeffrey Brown, Esq.
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Carmen E. Kipp, Esq.
Karen J. McClurg
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq.
Suite 1000, 10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and mailing the same, postage pre-paid on the ilth day of April,
1984.

fa/i fl/tn^y^
Subscribed and sworn to befor^ me this Ilth day of April,
1984.

NOTARY PUBLIC, residing at:
/7 ~^~

BJILDING CONTRACT AGREEMENT.
J D CONSTRUCTION
^
Jack C. Daniels, General Contractor
THIS AGREEMENT, made this 14th
thousand nine hundred and 80

day ofAugust

in the year one

by and between JACK C. DANIELS, J D

CONSTRUCTION party of the first part (hereinafter designated the
CONTRACTOR), and MICHAEL McCOY, KENNETH SITZBERGER, RESORT CONSJLTANTS,
LTD., a Utah general partnership, JML, a Utah limited partnership,
party of the second part (hereinafter designated PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY).
WITNESSETH that PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT CpUPANT, in consideration of
the fulfillment of the agreements herein made by the CONTRACTOR, agrees
with the said CONTRACTOR, as follows:
Article I.

The CONTRACTOR under the direction and to the satis-

faction of PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, shall and will provide all
the materials and perform all the work mentioned in the approved drawings and specifications.
Article II.

PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY shall furnish to the

CONTRACTOR, all drawings or explanations as may be necessary to detail
and illustrate the work to be done and the CONTRACTOR shall conform to
the same as part of this contract so far as they may be consistont with
the approved drawings and specifications.
It is mutually understood and agreed that all drawings and specifications are and remain the property of PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT
CO.iPANY.
Article III.

No alterations shall be made in the work shown

or described by the drawings and specifications.
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Article IV.

The CONTRACTOR shall provide sufficient, safe and

proper facilities at all times for the inspection of the work by
PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY or their authorized respresentatives.
Article V.

Should the CONTRACTOR at any time refuse or neglect

to supply a sufficiency of properly skilled workmen, or of materials
of the proper quality, or fail in any respect to prosecute the work
with promptness and diligence, or fail in the performance of any of
the agreements herein contained, such refusal, neglect or failure
being certified by PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY shall be at liberty,
after

14

days written notice to the CONTRACTOR, to provide any such

labor or materials, and to deduct the cost thereof from any money then
due or thereafter to become due to the CONTRACTOR under this contract?
and if PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY shall certify that such refusal,
neglect or failure is sufficient ground for such action, PART AVENUE
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY shall also be at liberty to terminate the employment of the CONTRACTOR for the said work and to enter upon the premises and take possession, for the purpose of completing the work
comprehended under this contract, of all materials thereon, and to
employ any other person or persons to the work and to provide the
materials therefor; and in case of such discontinuance of the employment of the CONTRACTOR he shall not be entitled to receive any further
payment under this contract until the said work shall be wholly finished, at whirh time, if the unpaid balance of the amount to be paid
under this contract shall exceed the expense incurred by PARK AVENUE
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY in finishing the work, such excess shall' be paid
by PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY to the CONTRACTOR, but if such
expense shall exceed such unpaid balance, the CONTRACTOR shall pay
the difference to PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,

Article VI.

The CONTRACTOR shall complete the several portions,

and the whole of the work comprehended in this Agreement by
15, 1981

May

provided that the CONTRACTOR shall have control and

authority to provide any and all subcontractors and laborers.

The

CONTRACTOR shall also have control over all disbursements on the construction loan.

PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY shall be at liberty

to examine CONTRACTOR'S books pertaining to this Agreement at any time
without notice, but only during normal working hours.
Also provided that all preliminary financial arrangements shall
be completed by PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY on or before
August 15,

1930 in order that construction may be initiated by

the CONTRACTOR.
Article VII.

Should CONTRACTOR be obstructed or delayed in the

prosecution or completion of his work by the act, neglect, delay or
default of PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, or of any other contractor
employed by PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY upon the work, or by any
damage which may happen by fire, lightning, earthquake or cyclone, or
by the abandonment of the work by the employees

through no default of

the CONTRACTOR, then the tine herein fixed for the completion of the
work shall be extended for a period equivalent to the time lost by
reason of any or all the causes aforesaid; but no such allowance
shall be made unless a claim therefor is presented in writing to
PARK AVE V UE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY within Pive days of the occurrence
of such delay.

The duration of such extension shall be certified

to by PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, but appeal ^rom their decision may be made to arbitration.

Article VIII.

It is hereby mutually agreed between the parties

hereto that the sum to be naid by PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT CO.IPANY to

,r /

A 7 or>r\r\ "jv* '/-^
t h e CONTRACTOR f o r s a i d work and m a t e r i a l s s h a l l be $ 3 0 6 f 0 0 0 . 0 0
JK W
^(cVvT^ rKiNOft50i\»»f>J*rTV SEL>QV / \ ^ o / M > ^ ;
^ W 7
EIOUMttfSlMlCD FIVE THOUSAND AND OO/HTQ- D o l l a r s p l u s p r o f i t and
o v e r h e a d of >gT|361»Q0 E ^ t f ^ - - ^ ^
SIXTY-ONE
AXJ}_IIQA&Q- Do 11 are

m

This payment shall be made within

60

days after this contract

is fulfilled.
If at any time there shall be evidence of

any lien or tclaim for

which, if established, PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY or the said
premises might become liable, and which is chargable to CONTRACTOR,
PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY shall have the right to retain out
oP any payment then due or thereafter to become cfue an amount sufficient to completely indemnify him against such lien or claim.

Should

there prove to be any such claim after all payments are made, CONTRACTOR shall refund to PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY all monies
that the latter may be compelled to pay in discharging any lein on
said premises made obligatory in consequence of CONTRACTOR'S default.
Article IX.

It is further mutually agreed between the parties

hereto that no certificate or final payment, shall be conclusive evidence of the performance of this contract, either wholly or in part,
and that no

payment shall '>e ejn^traed to '»f» an acceptance of defec-

tive work or improper naterials.
Article X.

PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY shall during the

progress of the work maintain full insurance on said work, in his own
name and in the name of CONTRACTOR, against loss or damage by fire.
The policies shall cover all work incorporated in the building, and

^,

all materials for the same in or about the premises, and shall be made
payable to the parties hereto, as their interest may appear.

Article XI.

The said parties for themselves, their heirs, executors,

administrators and assigns, do hereby agree to the full performance of
the covenants herein contained.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this AGREEvlENT the
day and year first above written.
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ADDENDUM TO BUILD INC} CONTRACT AGREEMENT
DATED AUGUST 14, 1930 BETWEEN JD CONSTRUCTION
AND PART AVENUE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
1.

Contractor acknowledges receipt of full set of working drawings
and specification sheets.

2.

Any change orders or modifications of the building specifications
must be in writing and signed by an authorized representative
from JD Construction and Park Avenue Development Co.

3.

This building contract agreement is subject to JD Construction
and MILAJACK, et. al, obtaining financing as outlined under
the Earnest Money agreements dated April 4, 1980, May 20, 1930
and July lf 1980 and signed by the above mentioned parties.

4.

Contractor agrees to review with developer subcontractor and
material bids and where feasible to ue alternate sources
which may be more cost efficient for the project without
jeopardizing the quality of construction. Any cost savings
would be subtracted from the total bid.

DATED

August 14, 1930

EXAM
I

MOST ALL OP Mr' WORK

1 I

2

AND OF COURSE MIKE AND LARRY

3

OF THE SPECTRUM

4

IT,

5

THAN

6

WE PORMED A CORPORATION

7

TO ENTER

9

WAS

HAD MORE

AND A LIMITED
WITH

WE BOUGHT

11

Q

HOW DID THAT

12

A

THIS WAS WHAT THEY OFFERED

20 PERCENT

IN WHICH

DEVELOPMENT.
VANCE

$80,000

OF THE PROJECT
FIGURE COME

13

THIS WAS THE COS1 THAT THEY OFFERED

14

PROJECT FOR $ 8 0 , 0 0 0 .

MCDONALD

FOR $ 8 0 , 0 0 0 .

ABOUT?

U S , 20 PERCENT OF--I MEAN
U S ; 20 PERCENT

OF THE

SO YOU AND M R . DANGERFIELD AND MR. LINNELL GOT

16

TOGETHER AND FORMED

17

Or

SOME

18

PARTNERSHIP

THAT YOU MAKE OR WAS ASKING O R - - .

A

Q

SIDE

IT, AND SO

INVESTMENT

10

15

IN THIS

KNOW HOW TO A P P R O A C H

PARK AVENUE

CAN YOU TELL ME HOW MUCH

PROPOSING

KNOWLEDGE

KNEW HOW TO APPROACH

INTO OUR A G R E E M E N T

Q

HAD BEEN DONE AS AN INDIVIDUAL.

I H A D , SO I D I D N ! T

MIKE AND LARRY

8

BY KINGHORN

SOME

SORT OF A - - S O M E

SORT OF AN ENTITY

KIND?

A

WE FORMED A C O R P O R A T I O N , M I L A J A K .

THAT W A S TAKEN

i|

19 .
!

FROM MIKE AND LARRY AND MY N A M E .

I

kiO i
I
SI

Q

OKAY.

WHAT WAS M I L A J A K

SUPPOSED

TO DO IN THE

°NCJ-:CT?

22 J

S3 «
?A

T

J U ' T — D U KNOW, I'M A CARPENTER AND THAT SIDE OF IT I KNOW,

HUf
j!

l

V IS C/.nr.R

SIDE

I WOULD HAVE

r

" j , U U KNOW,

DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW THAT ST'MHTURE
f

GtNfRALCO

or-ivr

'/ELL, I DON F T--I MEAN I TOLD YOU JUST PART OF IT.

A

U MrP'"RTE lS

J
I

SOCIATES [

f^whouse Duildirg
Sa't Lakfl O iv t 'ah 84111
iSU'363 2000

MANAGING FAHTNEH

vitrei J? IWkiglcy, RPR

\ Q

\

c

.

LEAVE--1

REALL V

EXAM BY KINGHORN
Q

WHAT ABOUT JML?

WAS THERE SOME KIND OF A

PARTNERSHIP OR SOMETHING PUT TOGETHER CALLED JML?
A

RIGHT.

THAT WAS'IN RESPECT TO THE CORPORATION.

IT W A S — W H A T LITTLE I REMEMBER--IT WAS THAT WE NEEDED A
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP TO GO INTO T H E — Y O U KNOW, AS A JOINT
VENTURE.
NOW, I'M NOT SURE I RIGHT KNOW THAT I UNDERSTAND
WHY OR — WITHOUT WORDS.
Q

DID YOU EVER RECEIVE ANY PAPERS FROM MR. DANGERFIELD

OR MR. LINNELL REGARDING THE FORMATION OF MILAJAK?
A
VERM.

WELL, VERN ROMNEY WAS OUR ATTORNEY.

WE APPROACHED

HE DREW UP ALL THESE PAPERS FOR US AND RECORDED THEM.

NOW, THIS IS ALL I CAN TELL YOU.

WHETHER VERN WAS THE ONE

THAT RECORDED THEM OR NOT, HE DREW THEM UP.
Q

OKAY.

WAS THAT TRUE OF JML PAPERS, TOO?

A

YES.

Q

DID YOUR AGREEMENT WITH MR, DANGERFIELD AND MR,

LINNELL REQUIRE THAT YOU PUT UP A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CASH,
AND MR- MCDONALD PUT UP A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CASH, AND MR.
LIMMELL PUT UP A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CASH?
r\

WELL, I DON T T KNOW ABOUT MCDONALD,
MR. MADSEN:

WE--.

I THINK YOU MEANT DANGERFIELD.
[fM SORRY.

0

EXCUSE ME, I MEANT DANGERFIELD;

A

TH!§ WAS O U R — Y O U KNOW, WE ALL TRIED TO GET--WE

BROUGHT IN ANOTHER MEMBER

INTO JML, AND HIS NAME WAS KENT

11

EXAM
FULLER.

AND

KENT

MONEY,

MIKE

OUT

$30,000,

TO

PUT

$28,000.

Q

$28,000?

$28,000

UP W I T H

Q

A

AND

JUST

MIKE

AND

LARRY

HOW MUCH MONEY

I

PUT

UP

SOME

DID;

AND

IT

TOTALLED

YOU

PUT

UP. P E R S O N A L L Y ?

DO YOU KNOW HOW MUCH MONEY

THAT

I

BE A G U E S S .

COME UP W I T H

REMAINDER.
PUT
HAVE

BUT

THE

REST

I

BELIEVE

$18,000,

THAT'S

AND

A GUESS,

THAT

KENT

LARRY

COME

YOU KNOW;

I

PUT

KNOW

UP.
YOU EVER

THAT

HAVE

MIKE

WAS H A N D L I N G

THE ATTORNEY
FIRST

AND

WOULD

OKAY.

DOCUMENTS

SOME MONEY,

UP?

THE

THE AMOUNT

UP

KINGHORN

WHICH WE G A V E .

A

PUT

PUT

SOME MONEY,

DO YOU R E C A L L

IT

HIS

UP

Q

OF THEM

UP

FULLER

BY

BEEN

SEEN AN-Y

FILED

VMS G R E E N ,

FOR

THAT

TAX

PART

TAX

RETURNS

PURPOSES
OF

IT,

FOR

AND

A MAN NAMED G R E E N .

I

OR

I

OTHER

JML?
BELIEVE

DONrT

KNOW

NAME.
MR.

MADSEN:

JOHN?

JOHN

WAS H I S

NAME,

GREEN

IN

THE

JUDGE

BUILDING?
A

WELL,

Q

DID

IT--GREEN

AND M I K E

HAD TO

HIRE

FROM JML

THAT

HIM,

YCU

F.LEr

AND

HOW

IT

THEY

WITH

EVER

YOUR

WOULD

BE

TAX

GIVE

YOU ANY

RETURNS

TREATED

THAT

FOR TAX

SCHEDULES
SHOWED

THIS

PURPOSES,

IF

INVESTMENT
YOU

CAN

RECALLf
A

NO,

I

JUST

HAVE

NO KNOWLEDGE.

LHAL COUK: ttfcPORTfEflS

i
•
ATES I

N»)wfiou3e Baiiong
!i«*!» LaXa G:ty. Ulan B-! ! M
(301) 363-XOO

I ANAGING PARINEH

LS i? Midgiey, RPR

12

MIKE

HANDLED

IT,

AND--

EXAM BY KINGHORN
Q

1

DO YOU HAVE ANY PARTNERSHIP DOCUMENTS OR JML AT

THIS TIME?

2

A

3
THEM.

4

NO, I DON'T.
I DON'T HAVE.

Q

5

IN FACT LARRY OR MIKE OR GREEN HAS

OKAY.

I IMAGINE IT TOOK SOME PERIOD OF TIME TO

6

GET ALL OF THIS ORGANIZED AND PUT TOGETHER, AND MOST OF THAT

7

TIME WAS SPENT IN THE SPRING OF 1980; IS THAT A FAIR

8

STATEMENT?
A

9

V/AS IN APRIL OR--CL05L' 10 THAT PERIOD 01 TIME, AND WE HAD

10
U

THE FIRST TIME THAT I WAS IN CONTACT WITH MCDONALD

'! FROM THEN UNTIL--IT WAS TV/0 OR THREE MONTHS, YOU KNOW,
OF COURSE I DON'T KNOV/ WHAT DATE WE HAD THE

13 I

CORPORATION FORMED OR THE JML.

14 |

LARRY AFTER I HAD TALKED TO MCDONALD.

I

Q

15 i

16 |
w

I HAD APPROACHED MIKE AND

DID YOU KNOW THE NAMES OF ANY OF THE OTHER PEOPLE

WHO WERE PUTTING MONEY INTO THIS, INTO THE INVESTMENT IN
THIS BUILDING?

|

18 !

A

j
19 j

I UNDERSTOOD IT WAS MCCOY, SITZBERGER, MCDONALD,

BOLDON, AND PAUL LANDES.

20 !
i
«21

Q

DID YOU EVER HEAR THE NAME "PARK CITY INVESTORS I"

DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME?
A

!

NO, BUT I KNOW OF IT NOW.

~!R'_L YOU WHETHER I HAD OR NOT,

I

? , SI.

Q

OKAY.

AL THAT TIME I COULDN'T

I COULD HAVE, BUT--

WERE YOU EVER PROVIDED A COPY OF A JOINT

£8 «' 11

j

VENTURE AGREEMENT THAT HAD THE

NAME

GENERAL CO'JRT REPORTERS
Suite 700

TDALE J.
IOHNSON
J&ASSOCIATFS

Newnouse Building
Sa.t Lake Cay, Utah 8 4 i r
,6Q^ J6JT0O0

MANAGING PARTNLR

Edward I? Midgley, UPU

13

'FARfsISWORTH

DEVELOPMENT 1 1

EXAM BY KINGHORN
Q

1

WELL, I MEAN, LET'S LOOK AT THE LAST PAGE OF THIS

2

ADDENDUM.

3

PAGES AS THE MAIN BUILDING CONTRACT ITSELF; ISN'T THAT

4

CORRECT?

5

A

6

Q

THIS HAS THE SAME SIGNATURES ON THE SAME SIGNATURE

YES.
WELL, I CAN'T SEE ANY DIFFERENCE.
MR. MADSEN: NO.

i

8

A

NO, LARRY SIGNED AND I SIGNED.

9

Q

OKAY.

AND THAT WAS--THAT BUILDING CONSTRUCTION

10

CONTRACT THAT'S PART OF EXHIBIT 110 IS AN AGREEMENT THAT

11

GOVERNED YOUR ACTIVITIES AS A CONTRACTOR.IN PHYSICALLY

12

ERECTING THE BUILDING AND BRINGING IN THE SUBCONTRACTORS

13

AND GETTING PAID FOR ALL OF THAT; IS THAT A FAIR STATEMENT?

14.

A

15

Q

16

WAS SIGNED?

17

A

YES.
OKAY.

WAS THE BUILDING STARTED WHEN THIS CONTRACT
•- •

YES, WHEN THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN WAS GRANTED,

18

THAT'S WHEN THIS WAS SIGNED, THE SAME DAY.

19

SIGNED THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN, THOUGH, THEY READ THIS OVER.

20

THERE WAS--I THINK MCCOY READ IT, BOLDON READ IT, AND

21

MCDONALD.

BEFORE WE

AND WE WENT OVER IT, BECAUSE THERE WAS A QUESTION
ON f?;E PROFIT ON IT, THE TOTAL AMOUNT.
24
'

m,

MADSEN:

THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE

|j c,QNS : f'ftueT!ON—.
GENtRAl COURT REPORTERS
luite 700

JALE J.

NowhO'.j5e Buifdmg

•INSON
\SSOCIATES

Sail Lake City, Utafi 84111
fflOD M3-2000

MANAGING PARTNER

Jward PftfidgSey,RPR

21

EXAM BY KINGHORN

1

Q

2

A

3

Q

I ' L L FOLLOW U P .
NO.

WHAT WAS THE QUESTION ABOUT THE PROFITS THAT CAME

4

UP THAT YOU JUST TESTIFIED ABOUT?

5

CAME UP ABOUT THE PROFIT ON IT, AND CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT

6

THAT?
A

7

YOU SAID SOME QUESTION

WELL,. I THOUGHT WE WAS SPEAKING ON THIS CONTRACT.

8

ON THIS CONTRACT THERE WAS A CROSSED-OUT--IT HAD BEEN

9

CROSSED OUT, YOU KNOW.

10

I FIGURED WHEN I TYPED THE CONTRACT

UP I WAS FIGURING THE PROFIT ON $875,000.

11

Q

OKAY.

12

A

BECAUSE I HAD NO IDEA WHAT THE BANK WAS GOING TO

13

HOLD BACK AND WHAT THERE WOULD BE IN THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN

14

ITSELF.

15

Q

OKAY.

16

A

AND USUALLY I TAKE MY PROFIT FROM THE HARD COST

1?

OF THE CONSTRUCTION, AND THIS IS WHERE WE WORKED THIS OUT

13

AND DERIVED THIS OTHER FIGURE FROM THAT FIGURE AFTER I

19 J

HAD ALL THE INFORMATION IN FRONT OF ME.

i
i

Q

20 i
21

li

OKAY.

SO THIS FIGURE THAT WAS WRITTEN IN HERE

ON PAGE h OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, IF 1 CAN READ IT

22

LIP'S IDE DOWN, IS—THERE'S A FIGURE THERE FOR THE MAIN COST

23

OF THE BUILDING, WHICH LOOKS LIKE $797,000.
AND THEM IT SAYS, "PLUS PROFIT AND OVERHEAD OF"--IS

24
25

THAT $80,253?

ii
GENERAL COURT REPORTERS

TDALE J.
JOHNSON
J'&ASSOCIATES

Suile 700
Nowhousa Building
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
(801j 363-2000

MANAGING PARTNER

E d w a r d f? fWidgley, RPR

22

EXAM BY KINGHORN
A

l !!

WELL, THAT INCLUDED — LET'S SEE IF I CAN--THIS

$80,250 INCLUDED THE PROFIT AND OVERHEAD TO THE COMBINED—NOW,
IT SEEMED TO ME LIKE THE PROFIT, THAT WAS $ 72,000, AND THE
OVERHEAD WAS $7,500 OR SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT.
TOTALED THE

5

$80,253.

AND I GOT THAT FROM--AFTER

6
OF

7

AND IT

I FOUND OUT THIS FIGURE

$797,000.
Q

8

SO YOUR PROFIT WAS INTENDED TO BE ROUGHLY

10 PERCENT

OF THE HARD COST; IS THAT CORRECT?

9
10

A

11

HARD COST.
Q

12

RIGHT,

AND T H A T ' S

WHAT I

FIGURED;

10 PERCENT OF THE

OKAY.

BEFORE YOU SIGNED T H I S AGREEMENT OR GOT THE

13

CONSTRUCTION LOAN, HAD YOU GONE UP TO PARK CITY AND KNOCKED

14

DOWN ANY OF THE OLD HOUSES OR DONE ANY CLEARING WORK OR

15

ANY EXCAVATION OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT ON THE PROPERTY?
A

16

NONE WHATSOEVER.

I HAD LOOKED AT THE PROPERTY,

AND I HAD CONTACTED THEM, MY SUBS, TO SEE WHAT I HAD.

17
18

MY EXCAVATOR HAD SEEN THE PROPERTY SO WE COULD SEE

19

ABOUT WHAT WE HAD TO DO TO REMOVE THE OLD HOUSES THAT WAS

20

ON 'rHE PROPERTY AND LEVEL IT.
Q

WAS THERE A PORTION OF YOUR ESTIMATE THAT WAS

ALL.' SATED TC THE DEMOLITION OF THE OLD HOUSES AND SO FORTH?
25

as

A

YES.

O

0HAV,

A

NOW, I DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT WOULD BE.

ENERAL COURT REPORTERS

»ALE J.
-INSON
.
ASSOCIATES

i

Suite 700

j

Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111

(801)363-2000

MANAGING PARTNER

[fward f? Mitlgley, RPR

23

IT WAS A TOTA!

EXAM

I

A

NO,

2

Q

HOW WAS

3

A

THEY

4

SUING

5

LIEN.

6
WITH

7
8

ME

A

EVIDENTLY

THIS,

12

PERIOD

13

CONSTRUCTION,

14

THE

15

BY

16 '

SOME OWNERSHIP

ALL

PROPFRTY

DID
IN

JOINT
IN

OKAY.

2C

A

YES.

Q

AM)

A

YES.

0

NCW,

25

LiriNELL

NOW,

YOU AT

TERMS

BACK

TO T " E

OHNSON

&

ASS0CIATES

(801)36J2-JJ<>

MANAGING PARTNL-*

CLAIM

ILLEGAL

THIS

BUT

WAS

ATTORNEYS

POSTED.

TIME

SOME

BY T H A T

VENTURE,

JOINT

CLAIMED

20

FROM

FOR

THE

THE

INTEREST
I

BY

OTHER

WE C L A I M E D
JML

MEAN

IN

NOT

REASON

OF

IN

YOU S A I D

PERCENT

OWNERSHIP?

JML;

THAT

TWO PARTNERS

69

20

DID.

PERCENT

OWNERSHIf

BELIEVE

WBRK THE

SIR.

GfcKi. J AL COURT HEPORTRS

J

AN

JML--.

YOU C L A I M E D

Suite "XN.
Newhout>e du cir g
Salt Lake C •, Utah 34 m

HAD

CONTRACT

CONTRACT

CORRECT?

-DALE J.

YOUR

TIME

SUMMONS

THROUGH MY

GOING

THAT

A

CONNECTION

THIS

THEY

THE

!

OF

BOND

YES,

AND

IN

OF A

VENTURE?

JML

FILING

PROCESS

OF O W N E R S H I P ?

THE

ME W I T H

BOND

LEARNED

CONSTRUCTION

IN

Q

'•rW

WAS

KIND

IT?

FOR

THEIR

WHEN YOU COMPLETED

19

9:5

WHAT

OF YOUR

PROJECT

DOLLAkS

ABOUT

IT

ABOUT

PRESENTED

THROUGH THE

RIGHT.

OF T I M E

A

LFARNED

DON'T--YE5,

Q

REASON

THEY

A MILLION

PROCEEDING?

I

LEARNH)

"IE.

THAT

11

THAT

YOU

AND

WHO LEARNED

18

SUED

YOU

JEFFS

NOT.

IT

HALF

LO

17

WAS

Q

LEARNED.

9

FOR

I

BY

IS

THAT

RIGHT?

DANGERFIELD
IN

JML;

IS

AND

THAT

IN

D'AM BY JEFFS

I
I1

2 !

A

AND KENT FULLER.

Q

AND KENT FULLER.

OKAY.

AND THAT WAS--WAS THAT

A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP OR A GENERAL PARTNERSHIP?

3

A

4

I REALLY CAN'T TELL YOU, BECAUSE I JUST--ALL I C A N -

5

IT'S A PARTNERSHIP, AND MY CONCERN WAS NOT REALLY WITH THAT.

6

I MEAN 1 INVESTED IN IT.

I WAS TOLD THAT WE COULD MAKE A

SUBSTANTIAL PROFIT ON THE BUILDING, AND MY CONCERN WAS PUTTING
8

THAT BUILDING UP AND DOING THE BEST JOB THAT I COULD DO IN

9

THE BUILDING IN HOPES FOR MORE WORK, A FUTURE.
Q

10

I BELIEVE YOU SAID THAT LATER THERE WAS A DISCUSSION

11

BETWEEN YOU AND YOUR PARTNERS IN JML ABOUT TRANSFERRING OR

12

DEEDING THAT INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY TO MICHAEL MCCOY, AND

13

THAT AS YOU MET TOGETHER YOU DID NOT FAVOR MAKING THE

14

TRANSFER AND THEY DID; IS THAT RIGHT?
A

15

YES, THAT IS RIGHT.

MY FAITH HAD DIMINISHED

16

SLIGHTLY WITH MCCOY AND I CAN'T UNDERSTAND WHY YOU TAKE AND

17

HAND HIM THE V/HOLE BASKET WITHOUT AT LEAST HAVING YOUR HAND

18

ON THE HANDLE.

19

Q

20 ||

!l
2 1 i!

NOW, I GATHER, HOWEVER, FROM WHAT YOU'VE SAID,

THAT AFTER THAT MEETING WHEN YOUR PARTNERS SAID THEY WANTED
TO DO THAT, YOU ALLOWED THAT TO BE DONE?

22 ,1

A

THEY ONLY NEEDED TWO SIGNATURES.

Q

SO THEY COULD BIND YOU BY THEIR SIGNATURES?

|l

23 ji

j!
A
YES, SIR.
1 GUESS THAT'S WHAT THEY COULD. I
24 i !
25
REALLY DON'T KNOW, RUT THAT'S — F R O M WHAT I'VE UNDERSTOOD
CEMEFIAL COURT REPORTERS

DALE }.
OHNSON
^ASSOCIATES

J

Suite 700
New'iouso Rui'd n y
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,301) 303 "000

MANAGING PAHTNt.P
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NOTICE OF LIEN
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned

Jack, C, D a n i e l s __- _J_D Cons-trjiction

_ General C o n t r a c t o r
doing business as _.
and residing at
ifeSl_jlojro\An_
-County of
SftJLt LflJk_e_
State of Utah, hereby claim
and intend- to hold and claim a lien upon that certain land and premises, owned and reputed to be
owned by Tf\ U^AAJJI^

&> 7A C* CSK4

}

1JSSW £&>*^a* » DJJUA&JX

6*£e^

, County of

jSnmmi t

situate, lying and being in
PaxlL-Hi t y
State of Utah, described as follows, to wit:
1039 Park Avenue,

Eight Unit Condominium

Park City,

Lots 8. 9. 10. 23. 2 4 . 25 and the Southern
of lots

11 and 2 2 , Block 4, Park City

the official
County

plat thereof

Recorder's

Survey,

Utah
(1 /2)

according

to

on file and of recorjL_uj_the _5ujnmjit

Office^

fCyisytAs^ n^s PcUiJz. Gsvt-e^KjL+jLCL-Y&J7&

one-half

and

terJkttL j / h A f c ^ a K ^ L

I—Entry
r,.i,uMu
M„

RECOPnrf)
BIQU1
*EE

-JL6&2&S:

&*&*&

U»-a^

$ Y&3
iNDErarrr:
to secure the payment of the sum of
18 CU253..
owing to the undersigned for QQJasJLHlCJtXQJLGeneral

„
L=i!lP A.JC o ndojnxrLLum.

Dollars,

Contractor

..Pecgniber I , 1 9 8 1

m, on and about the.

..on said land

That the said indebtedness accrued and the undersigned furnished said materials to (or was em(Eraa* •eeordias to th* fact)

ployed by)

Jack C. Daniels

~ J D

Construction
. _who was the

Contractor

owner and the reputed owner of said premises as
contract made between the said- J?!?!^*!^®!! 1 „
and the undersigned
on the ~ B t h _ d a y of~AU£SLSdL_ ~, 19..J3P, D y the terms of which the undersigned did agree

aforesaid, under aJ3uil<
Company
to

construct

eight unit condominium

and the s a i d _ 2 ? y < ^ 1 ^ 2 . </2 <7VU* (AS^ y <&*w £&+tf~^ *-&^%^^-&-£*^^
-did agree to pay the undersigned therefor as follows, to wit: _ S l x ty_-d ay_S __&£!«. E- t i l l a
cnnt.ract.-jraa f u l f i l 1 eji
____
.
_and under which said contract the undersigned did _ f u r n i s h
„ the first l a b o r &_jn_ate.rials_ on the
2bth. _
day of
^„August-.J-9J8Iland did _Jf uxnxsiL _
_ _thelast
- Xabor _
on the
1st
_ day of
December. 1981
_
_ and on and between said last mentioned
furnish labor
amounting
days, did
$80,253.00
_
Dollars,
to the sum of
which was the reasonable value thereof, and on which the following payments have been made to wit
NONE
leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of J&8D*.2.5J2L QX2 - ~
Dollars after deducting all just credits and offsets, and for which
demand the undersigned hold

and claim „ a hen by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, of Title

38, of the Utah Code Annotated 1953.

/

>i

/I

/ V J a c k C. D a n i e l s - J I) C o n s t r u c t i o n

*3C

CD
CD
CD

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

h

£aXt-Lake.
Jack C. Daniels

. being first duly sworn, says that he is

Jd^.

..claimant—, in the foregoing Notice of Lien ;

that he has heard rtau a»iu uuuue mm HHUWB the contents thereof, and that the same is true of his
own knowledge.

,19^

/Osubscfib
icribeoVan&sworn to before me this

Notary Public.

^unv^Arl '

•<\

'

<1

O

« r

*

1
1

£
«

a I

z
o

»
N« % .

e
5t0f

H»

<o

*

K

.'
t

rt

AGAINST

f
•a

Recorded at the. req

0
e

-
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GORDON A.
ROBERT C.
Attorneys
320 South
Salt Lake
Telephone

MADSEN
CUMMINGS
for Defendant Daniels
Third East
City, Utah 84111
322-1141

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CEN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACK C. DANIELS,, et al.,
Defendants.
AMENDED ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIM and
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT

JACK C. DANIELS,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 6790
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION, A-ONE CONSTRUCTION,
INC., MILLER BRICK SALES,
EUGENE E. DOMS and MICHAEL R.
McCOY,
Third-Party Defendants.

Defendant/third-party plaintiff, Jack C. Daniels, by
these presents, adopts and realleges the provisions of the Answer
and Counterclaim and the Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim
heretofore filed in the above-entitled action.
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
Third-party plaintiff, Jack C. Daniels, complains and
alleges as follows:

1.

Third-party defendant, Deseret Savings & Loan

Association, is a Utah corporation engaged in the mortgage lending
business with principal offices in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah; third-party deieauant, ,A-One Construction, Inc., is
a Utah corporation with principal offices in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah; third-party defendant, Miller Brick Sales, is a Utah corporation with principal offices in Salt Lake County, State of Utah;
third-party defendants, Eugene E. Doms and Michael R. McCoy are
residents of the State of California.
2.

Third-party defendant, Deseret Savings & Loan

Association, claims some interest in the subject matter, the real
property located in Park City, Summit County, State of Utah, by
virtue of eight trust deeds recorded in the office of the Summit
County Recorder as Entries 189008 - 189015, Book M213, Pages 411
through 442 inclusive, dated February 22, 1982, and recorded
March 1, 1982.
3.

Third-party defendant, A-One Construction, Inc.,

makes some claim in the real property, the subject matter of this
lawsuit, by virtue of a mechanic's lien recorded April 30, 1982,
Entry No. 19097 at Book M218, Page 537, filed in the office of
the Summit County Recorder.
4.

Third-party defendant, Miller Brick Sales, claims

some interest in the real property located in Park City, Utah, the
subject matter of this lawsuit, by virtue of a mechanic's lien
recorded in the office of the Summit County Recorder May 18, 1982,
-2-

Entry No. 191542, Book M220, Page 33.
5.

Third-party defendant, Eugene E. Doms, claims some

interest in the real property located in Park City, Utah, the subject matter of this lawsuit, by virtue of a Notice of Interest
recorded in the office of the Summit County Recorder May 20, 1982,
as Entry No. 191631, Book 220, Page 173.
6.

Third-party defendant, Michael R. McCoy, pursuant

to a Complaint, Affidavit and Amended Complaint filed in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Civil No. C-82-4628,
alleges that the real property in question is owned by "Park Avenue
Development, a Utah joint venture" and that he, Michal R. McCoy,
has acquired the interest of all joint venture parties and is
accordingly owner of the premises, the real property located in
Park City, Utah, the subject matter of this lawsuit.
7.

All of the said interests of the third-party

defendants are junior to, and therefore inferior to, the lien of
defendant/third-party plaintiff, Jack C. Daniels.
V7HEREFORE, defendant/third-party plaintiff, Jack C.
Daniels, prays that the court foreclose defendant/third-party
plaintiff's mechanic's lien and that defendant/third-party plaintiff have judgment as against plaintiff and third-party defendants
and that the court order that said property be sold, or so much
thereof as may be necessary as provided by law to satisfy the
terms of said lien and the applicable statute, including interest,
accrued costs and attorney's fees, and should there be a
-3-

deficiency resulting from said sale, that defendant/third-party
plaintiff be given judgment against plaintiff1and third-party
defendants for such deficiency.

jlLi fL

j^~^/7

/fGpRDON A. MADSEN
^>
(OtiERT C. CUMMINGS
^ttorn^ys for Defendant/Third-Party
Plaintiff, Jack C. Daniels
320 South Third1East Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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<^v
/ernon B. Romney
Gordon A. Madsen
Robert C. Cummings
Attorneys for Defendant,
Jack c. Daniels
320 South Third East
Salt take City, Utah 34111
Telephones "(801) 322-1141
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CEN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM

vs.
JACK c. DANIELS, DEBRA
ESTES, SCOTT BERRY, DEBRA
ANN SITZBERGER, and AMY
STANTON EAGLESON,

Civil No. 6790

Defendants.
1.Comes now the Defendant JACK C. DANIELS and answers
Plaintiff's verified Complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
2.Said verified Complaint rails to state a claim against
this answering Defendant' upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
3. Answering paragraph 1 thereof admits that Plaintiff
appears as record owner of the real property described in
said paragraph, admits that CEN CORPORATION has some equitable
ownership therein and otherwise denies the allegations of said
paragraph 1.
4. Admits that he has recorded a Notice of Lien relating
to said property and otherwise denies the allegations of said
paragraph 2.
5. Denies the allegations of paragraph 3 and 4C
6. Answering paragraph'5, said Defendant incorporates as
his answer,thereto his Answers as hereinabove set forth.

An-

swering paragraph & admits? that he recorded a Notice of Lien,

that a copy thereof is annexed hereto as Exhibit A and speaks
for itself and otherwise denies the allejations of paragraph 6.
7. Denies the ailegationsof paragraphs 7, 8 and 9.
8. In- answering paragraph 10 this Defendant adopts as his
answer thereto his answers as hereinabove set forth.
9. Denies the allegations of paragraph 11 and 12.
10. Answering paragraph 13 adopts as his answer thereto
lis answers as hereinabove set forth.
11. For lack of Information and belief denies the allerations of paragraphs L4r 15, 16 and 17.
12. Answering paragraph 18, adopts as his answer thereto
tis answers as hereinabove set forth.
13. For lack of Information and belief denies the allegations of paragraphs 19, 20 and 21.
14. Answering paragraph 22 adopts as his answer thereto
lis answers as hereinabove set forth.
15. For lack of information denies the allegations of paragraphs 23, 24 and 25.
COUNTERCLAIM
As a Counterclaim against the Plaintiff, Defendant
FACK C. DANIELS alleges as follows:
l.(

Plaintiff;is indebted to Defendant JACK C. DANIELS

m the sum of $80,253,00 together with interest as

Gf

Auqust

>6, 1980 for materials and labor furnished by PlaintLff to Defeniant on premises described on the attached Notice of Lien, which
jien is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
2.

That on or about February 2, 1982, the Defendant

;imely and in accordance with law filed said Notice of Lien in
:he Office of the Recorder of Summit County, Utah.
3.

That the said real property described in said

Jotice of Lien is security for payment of the aforesaid debt and

-2-

the said Notice of Lien has priority over any interest of
Plaintiff in said property.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that the Plaintiff's verified
Complaint be-dismissed and for judgment on his Counterclaim as
follows?
That the Court determine the amount due to Defendant
from Plaintiff including interest and costs and that said Notice
of Lien be foreclosed in accordance with the law and the practice
of this Court and that the property, or so much thereof as may
be necessary, be sold as provided by law to satisfy the aforesaid amount owing together with interest accruing costs and
should there be a deficiency resulting from

such sale, that

Plaintiff be given judgment against Plaintiff for said deficiency.

\!k> t". Cu^

Gordon A. Madsen#Vernon u< uomhey and
Robert C. Cummings
Attorneys for Defendant
Jack C. Daniels

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Answer
and Counterclaim was delivered to Plaintiff, CEN Corporatior
addressed to Charles C. Brown, Spencer & Brown, Suite 1200,
Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84111, by placing it in U. S. Mail, postage pre-paid on
this
>fr day of March, 1982.

utL

-3-

¥

' ^L~-

GORDON A.
ROBERT C.
Attorneys
320 South
Salt Lake
Telephone

MADSEN
CUMMINGS
for Defendant finiels
Third East
City, Utah
Mill
322-1141

IN THE DISTRICT C »M|H' (F SUMMi'I ( OWITY, STATE OF UTAH

)

CEN CORPORATION,

)

Plaintif t,

vs.

A*ii:*'DMENT TO VJT.VPR
A'JD COUNTERCLAIM

)

JACK C, DANIELS, et al . ,

)

Defendants.

)

Civil NO. 6790
)
As a Third Delense, defendant, ^ack C. Daniels, allou^s
as follows:
Prior to expiraf-'or of th-

»i r>tu*-rry period for filn.j

a mechanic's lien in t u > matter, Pichie] McCoy, in behiJf i i
plaintiff's predecessors, tc-wit, fli.'hiel McCoy, Kenneth Sit >berger, and Resort Con ultants, Ltd., -\nd/or Park Avenue Dr\oi lament, and/or 1039 Park A^r nu<* Devel )pix»*nt , requested de<orvL<nt
not to file a mechanic's liei withL t the time permitted b/ i ^v
and stated to him that ii he would -ofcam from filing, lu.3 ^laim
v^ould be paid within two

ee;.s.

Plimtiff'r. said predec. 5f3ci c

have failed to honor that renresent.it ion ind this defendant his
teen paid nothing and was required *-o file a Lien, and by virtue
of tie aforesaid circumstances the period for filing mechanic's
lien has been extended, and defendant's mechanic's lien ha^

r

ccn

tamely filed under the ri icunstance ? of this case, or an -h-*
alternative the plaintiff and its predecessors are estopped *-n
assert that said mechanic's

ien war; n')t timely fil^d.

. Ui-=- --—_ _UL-L

ROBERT r. CUMMINGS
\t\ornc/ for Defendant Daninis

Served a cop;, •„•! the for< < oi KJ OJI Keith W. Meade,
attorney for the plaint Jif, this;
personallydeliveriiv

': 1 day of June, J 932, by

to him a copy uf: the same.

-';• V

.

